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NONEMERGENCY MUNICIPAL CURFEW
ORDINANCES AND THE LIBERTY
INTERESTS OF MINORS
I. Introduction
Most crimes committed in the United States occur in cities,' and a
large proportion of these crimes are committed by juveniles under the
age of eighteen. 2 Although the total number of reported Crime Index
1. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES (1983)[hereinafter cited as U.C.R., for Uniform Crime Reports]. Of the 12.9
million Crime Index offenses occurring in 1982, id. at 39, 10,842,834 occurred in
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (S.M.S.A.s), compared with 646,598 in rural
areas, Id. at 43. The Crime Index offenses represented by the U.C.R. statistics are:
murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft and
motor vehicle theft. Id. at 41. The U.C.R. figures are compiled by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation from the voluntary reporting of city, county and state law
enforcement agencies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1976). Id. at 1. This reporting
system has been criticized. See C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA
362 (1977) (suggests inaccuracy arises from having local police chiefs report crime
figures) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA].
The "S.M.S.A." designation for a metropolitan area was created by the Office of
Management and Budget and describes an area containing a core city with at least
50,000 people, a resident labor force which is at least 75% nonagricultural, and
surrounding counties for which the core city is the place of employment for at least
30% of the county population. J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS-ITS
PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC LIFE 3 (3d ed. 1975). Recently, the S.M.S.A.
designation has been changed in favor of three separate "M.S.A." categories: the
Consolidated Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (the largest), the Metropolitan
Statistical Area, and the Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (the smallest).
Malcolm, A Tale of the Two Kansas Cities: They Fear a Federal Divorce, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 10, 1984, at A12, col. 2.
See also J. LAUB & M. HINDELANG, ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION
SURVEY DATA OF SERIOUS DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR-JUVENILE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IN
URBAN, SUBURBAN, AND RURAL AREAS (1981). This study concludes that urban crime
not only occurs at a higher rate than does rural crime, but that it. is also more likely to
involve victims who are strangers to the delinquent and frequently involves group
crime. Id. at 66, 67. The report also notes the lack of research concerning the special
effect of the urban environment on juvenile crime, commenting that "[d]espite the
fact that extent of urbanization is one of the strongest and most enduring correlates of
criminality, it has been virtually.ignored by theorists and researchers alike." Id. at
66. This lack has been noted by other researchers as well. See, e.g., D. STOTT,
DELINQUENCY: THE PROBLEM AND ITS PREVENTION 299 (1982) (author suggests need
for researchers to explain why underprivileged areas of cities have such great delin-
quency problems while the problem is less severe in other regions of world having
lower standard of living) [hereinafter cited as:STOTT].
2. U.C.R, supra note 1, at 165. Of all arrests reported by the nationwide survey
for Crime Index offenses, 31 % involved juveniles under the age of eighteen. Id. Of
all arrests made in cities for all crimes, including those for crimes which are not
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offenses3 decreased slightly in 1982, 4 surveys of popular attitudes
toward crime show an increased fear of crime, 5 especially among
persons living in urban areas.6
Various theories exist concerning the causes of juvenile delin-
quency 7 and measures for reducing or preventing delinquency have
Crime Index offenses, 19.4% involved juveniles under eighteen. Id. at 193. Of the
1,141,122 juvenile offenders taken into custody by police departments in 1982, 84 %
were city youths. Id. at 242 (final figure computed by author from statistics in
source). Among the Crime Index offenses, juveniles eighteen and tinder had the
greatest proportionate number of arrests for any age group for the crimes of motor
vehicle theft, arson, robbery, burglary and larceny-theft. Id. at 346-48.
The connection between drug abuse and juvenile crime is often stressed. See P.
KRATCOSKI & L. KRATCOSKI, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 10 (1979) (noting that number of
drug abuse arrests of juveniles reported nationwide increased to 95,299 in 1976
compared with 1,458 in 1960) [hereinafter cited as JUVENILE DELINQUENCY].
3. See supra note I for a list of Crime Index offenses.
4. U.C.R., supra note 1, at 43. The 12.9 million Crime Index offenses in 1982
represent a 3 % decline from the 1981 figure of 13.3 million. Id. at 39. The only crime
that showed an increase in 1982 was aggravated assault. Id. Compared with the
Crime Index total for 1973, however, the 1982 figure represents a 47% increase. Id.
5. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1982 213 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK]. The Gal-
lup Poll therein cited asked respondents the following question: "Is there any area
right around here-that is, within a mile-where you would be afraid to walk alone
at night?" In 1967, 31 % responded yes. In 1982, 48 % so responded, an increase of 3 %
from the 1981 poll. Id. But see SOURCEBOOK, supra, at 209 (another Gallup Poll
indicated 7% reduction from 1981 to 1982 in number of respondents who felt there
was more crime in survey area than during previous year).
6. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 213. There was a sharp difference between the
percentage of positive responses among those living in urban areas having a popula-
tion of greater than one million, where 57% so responded, and those living in rural
areas with a population under 2,500, where only 31 % expressed their fear of crime.
id.
7. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, REPORTS OF THE NAT'L JUVENILE JUSTICE ASSESSMENT CENTERS, THE PREVEN-
TION OF SERIOUS DELINQUENCY: WHAT TO Do? 27-46 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
SERIOUS DELINQUENCY]. This paper credits the "control theory" of delinquency causa-
tion as having the greatest scientific support. Id. at 28. Simply stated, this theory
suggests that delinquency occurs when it is not properly prevented and where there is
"inadequate attachment, particularly to parents and school; inadequate conmit-
ment, particularly to educational and occupational success, and inadequate belief,
particularly in the legitimacy and moral validity of the law." Id. at 29. The other
major theory as to the cause of juvenile delinquency is the "cultural deviance" theory,
which suggests that delinquents are actually seeking to conform with social values of
a neighborhood, but that these values are in conflict with those of the conventional
societal norms. Id. at 30, 43-45.
See also D. WEST, DELINQUENCY-ITs ROOTS, CAREERS AND PROSPECTS 129 (1982).
Some of the factors which are suggested as contributing to juvenile delinquency
include: (1) the individual's hereditary predisposition (e.g., aggressive tempera-
ment); (2) a delinquent's personality traits (e.g., drug and alcohol abuse); (3) an
unsatisfactory home environment (e.g., criminal parents), (4) poor social circum-
stances (e.g., neighborhood and schools); (5) predisposition towards crime (e.g.,
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been suggested.8 Federal9 and state legislation' ° has specifically ad-
boredom, a need for money); (6) precipitating events (e.g., fight vitl; family); and
(7) opportunities for crime (e.g., unguarded property, weakness of victim). Id. Other
factors that have been suggested as being prevalent among delinquents are infrequent
father-son interactions, high levels of punishment, and lower educational aspirations
of delinquent boys. L. SAVITZ, M. LALLI & L. ROSEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L
INST. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, CITY LIFE AND DELIN-
QUENCY-SUMMARY REPORT 15 (1977).
Another author discusses five major theories of delinquency that have been devel-
oped since the 1700's. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 2, at 42. The classical
approach viewed delinquency as a conscious choice of minors, which choice violated
the "pleasure over pain" deterrence equation. Id. at 43-44. The biological approach
promulgated in the 1800's maintained that certain physical characteristics of children
might indicate potential delinquency in the future. Current biological theory empha-
sizes the effects of defective genes increasing the probability of delinquency. Id. at
44-46. The psychological theory is based on Freud's studies about inadequate parent
training and its effects on children later-in adolescence. Id. at 46-51. The sociological
school emphasizes the role played by the juvenile's environment in contributing to
delinquency. Id. at 52. The socio-psychological approach stresses the dual effects of
the individual child's personality and psychology and the physical environment the
child grows up in. Id. at 60-64. Where a particular theory of delinquency causation is
emphasized, the choice of a prevention strategy will be accordingly affected. For
example, the sociological theory of causation would emphasize prevention programs
such as the Mobilization for Youth, which sought to improve a juvenile's environ-
ment. Id. at 367-68. There are also delinquency prevention methods adopted from
the psychology and clinical sociology schools, such as family intervention and "child
behavior contracts." R. TROJANOWICZ & M. MORASH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: CON-
CEPTS AND CONTROL 243-45, 261-62 (1983).
8. See, e.g., SERIOUS DELINQUENCY, supra note 7, at 5-16. This paper defines two
major approaches to delinquency prevention. The traditional "corrective approach"
attempts to identify and correct the problems of identified delinquents, predelin-
quents and high risk youths. Id. at 5. The "preclusive approach" seeks to prevent the
initial occurrence of delinquent acts. Id. at 6. A juvenile curfew is an example of the
latter approach. The study concludes that primary emphasis should be placed on the
preclusive prevention approach in practice. Id. at 61.
"Educative punishment" of juveniles has also been suggested. STOTT, supra note 1,
at 312. This would involve a system of victim-offender reconciliation wherein the
juvenile would meet the victim and a program of restitution, utilizing the youth's
employment earnings or community work, would be arranged. The hope is that the
offender will learn of the consequences of his or her delinquent acts by meeting with
the victim. Id. See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS AND GOALS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE]. This
report identifies five major goals which the suggested standards seek to achieve: (1)
the reduction of juvenile violence; (2) the reduction of delinquent recidivism; (3)
assuring due process rights of juveniles subject to delinquency proceedings; (4) inte-
grating the existing juvenile justice system with prevention programs; and (5) ensur-
ing that deprived or abused children are protected. Id. at 14-15. Some of the
standards urged by the Task Force include the development of comprehensive delin-
quency prevention programs (Standard 1. 1), the establishment of protective services
for children (Standard 3.5), greater dissemination of crime prevention information
by local police departments (Standard 3.31), and the interaction of the juvenile
justice system in educating school children (Standard 3.32). Id. at 35, 92, 148-50.
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The need for greater involvement by municipal police departments has also been
emphasized. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 2, at 195-202. While the most
obvious means of enhancing police intervention in high delinquency areas is to
increase the number of police officers, special training is urged as the top priority. Id.
at 200. Officers should become aware of the other governmental and private agencies
that deal with the problems of delinquent youth. Id. Personal involvement of the
officers in youth programs such as the New York Police Athletic League help to instill
respect for the law and police officers in participants. Id. at 201. Accord A. COFFEY,
THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 129 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PREVEN-
TION OF CRIME].
Every person has a responsibility to take proper safety precautions to deter delin-
quency by "hardening the target." E. BANFIELD, THE UNItEAVENLY CITY REVISITED
204 (1974). Anti-crime publicity, educational instruction and simple measures such
as using better locks and alarms are effective because "most crimes are committed
opportunistically by youths who want small amounts of money right away and will
not go to nuch trouble, or take much risk to get it. A target need be hardened very
little to protect it from them." Id. Accord W. GORHAM & N. GLAZER, THE URBAN
PREDICAMENT 190-91 (1976) (discussing use of burglar alarms, street lighting and
personal use of alarms, whistles and mace) [hereinafter cited as URBAN PREDICA-
MENT]; PREVENTION OF CRIME, supra, at 54-56 (designating citizen apathy and mis-
perception of their ability to reduce crime as problems hindering crime prevention
efforts).
9 'See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THIRD ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION: FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PRO-
CRAMS (1979) [hereinafter cited as ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION]. The report describes
some of the federal programs which are designed to improve the socioeconomic
positions of families in general as opposed to particular delinquency prevention
programs. Id. at 73-95. For example, Title XX of the Social Security Act of 1975
provides for distribution of federal money to states for youth services such as emer-
gency shelter facilities, unemployment referral networks and assistance for abused
youths. Id. at 77-79 (Title XX is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (Supp. V 1981)). Title
IV-B of the Act, referred to as the Child Welfare Services Act, provides formula
grants to state governments for foster care, day care and child counseling services. Id.
at 86-88. (Title IV is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 620-28 (Supp. V 1981)). Problems have
arisen with such programs, including lack of uniformity of state standards, lack of
citizen participation and the difference in juvenile eligibility status. Id. at 77-79. See
also inJra note 14 and accompanying text.
The role that social-welfare improvements play in reducing crime in the short run
has been criticized. See URBAN PREDICAMENT, supra note 8, at 195 ("[i]t would be a
mistake, however, to suppose that reducing poverty, improving housing, or equaliz-
ing educational opportunities will, of themselves and in the short run, contribute
substantially to a reduction in predatory crime"). Yet, another author in referring to
the causal connection between high unemployment in American cities and a corre-
spondingly high crime rate refers to street crime as "self-employment" which offers
"flexible hours, minimal risks, tax-free income, and prestige among one's peers."
Gross, Some Anticrime Proposals for Progressives, CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 51, 53
(Summer 1982) [hereinafter cited as Anticrime Proposals].
10. For examples of specific delinquency prevention statutes, see ALA. CODE §§
44-1-1 to -77 (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-5-102 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-1
to -44 (1982 & Supp. 1983) (Children & Youth Services Act): Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
219.010 to .086 (Vernon 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-177.31 to -177.36 (West
1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-6-1 to -3 (1978 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§
410-426 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1983-1984) (Youth Commission Law); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 72.05.010 to .310 (1982) (Children & Youth Services Act); WYo.
STAT. § 9-2-102 (Supp. 1983).
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dressed the serious problem of juvenile delinquency and has created
administrative programs to study the causes of delinquency and to
fund prevention programs." On the federal level, the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act 12 expresses the concern of Congress
for the seriousness of the delinquency problem, 13 recognizes the failure
For statutes which address social welfare problems involving minors generally, see,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.21.010 (1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-501 to -520
(Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 83-501 to -503 (1976); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8200-
8429.5 (West Supp. 1983) (Child Care & Development Services Act); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-2601 to -2611 (1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 56-601 to -609 (1976) (Youth
Conservation Act); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 5001-5041 (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp.
1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-3901 to -3912 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit.22, §§ 4001-4071 (Supp. 1983-1984) (Child & Family Services & Protection Act);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
400.115 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983-1984); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-15-1 to -21 (1972 &
Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-1101 to -1143 (1983) (Youth Residential
Services Act); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 233D.020 to -.070 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-
09-01 to -24 (1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5153.01 to .53 (1981); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 607 (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.687 to .697
(1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-73-1 to -10 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-7-
101 to -110 (Supp. 1983) (Children's Service Commission Act); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 72.001 to .007 (Vernon Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 458-462
(1981); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-549 to -553 (1979).
The Georgia Children and Youth Services Act is an example of a detailed statute
specifically addressing juvenile delinquency problems. The State Department of
Human Resources is empowered under the act to establish programs designed to
provide delinquency prevention services, child welfare services, juvenile court assist-
ance, regional group care, adoption and medical services and to build and maintain
state juvenile institutions of varying degrees of security. GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-8(a)
(1982 & Supp. 1983).
Some of the purposes frequently seen in the more general youth development acts
are included in the California Child Care and Development Services Act, which
notes that the purposes of its state supported child care facilities include "provid[ing]
the opportunity for positive parenting to take place through understanding of human
growth and development . . . [and] reduc[ing] strain between parent and child in
order to prevent abuse, neglect, or exploitation .... CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8201(d),
(e) (West 1982).
11. TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 15-16. In calling for states
to establish the financing of delinquency prevention programs as a high priority, the
Task Force recommends the creation of a single state agency to coordinate the
various local programs' financing efforts. Id. at 59.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5751 (1976 & Supp. 1981). After the enactment of the
1980 amendments, President Carter, on signing the bill into law, commented that
"[s]ix years after its enactment, we can take great pride in its accomplishments. It has
demonstrated many new alternatives to traditional methods of dealing with children
in the juvenile justice system and contributed to substantial progress in providing fair
and effective treatment for our young people." OFFICE OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, RE-
SEARCH AND STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDEXED LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF "THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AMENDMENTS OF 1980" 241 (1981).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(1) (1976) (Congress concludes that nearly half of all
arrests for serious offenses involve juveniles).
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of current remedial measures 14 and establishes an administrative ar-
rangement 5 for the allocation of funds for prevention programs 6 to
states which fulfill certain requirements. 17 The vital role played by the
local community in preventing delinquency is frequently empha-
sized. 18
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(2)-(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Congress specifically
mentions failures of overburdened juvenile justice systems to provide effective indi-
vidual justice, of social agencies to assist needs of dependent and abandoned children,
and of the public and private sectors to create programs to address problems of drug
and alcohol abuse among children). Congress succinctly admits this failure when
stating that "existing Federal programs have not provided the direction, coordina-
tion, resources, and leadership required to meet the crises of delinquency." Id. at §
5601(a) (7) (Supp. 1981). Accord SERuous DELINQUENCY, supra note 7, at 3. This study
also notes the general failure of federal research efforts when stating that "recent
Federal prevention efforts appear to lack the conceptual foundation, clear prevention
focus, and commitment to rigorous research that are necessary to generate the
knowledge required for effective delinquency prevention." Id. at 3.
Other problems can plague delinquency prevention efforts, such as inadequate
information, difficulties in reaching agreement among the local community, govern-
ment agencies and the criminal justice system, and the lack of prevention expertise.
PREVENTION OF CRIME, supra note 8, at 205-13. Although research may be lacking,
delinquency efforts should not be delayed until further research is conducted, but
should be adjusted accordingly as new findings arise. H. WITMAR & E. Turs, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION PROGRAMS 50 (1957).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 5611 (1976 & Supp. 1981); ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, supra
note 9, at 1. The Act created the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion, which consists of the Office of Operations, which coordinates all federal juve-
nile delinquency programs and awards formula grants to qualifying states, and the
National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, which directs
research and education efforts. The Office of Juvenile Justice is a part of the Law
Enforcement Administration, which is under the direction of the Attorney General
and the Department of Justice. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, supra note 9, at 1.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 5632 (Supp. V 1981) (minimum of $225,000 per qualifying
state is provided, with remaining funds distributed based upon relative number of
minors within the states).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Congress mandates that a state
must submit a three-year plan and submit annual performance reports. In addition,
two-thirds of the money received by the state must be expended through local
government or local private agency programs. Id. at § 5633(a)(5)(A), (B) (Supp. V
1981). Three-fourths of all funds provided by the federal government must, in
addition, be expended on programs designed to prevent delinquency, to divert juve-
niles from the juvenile justice system, and to develop community alternatives to
juvenile detention. Id. § 5633 (a)(10) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). To qualify for federal
funds, a state must end the practice of detaining juveniles with adults. Id. at §
5333(a)(13) (Supp. V 1981).
18. See PREVENTION OF CRIME, supra note 8, at 53, 126 (community involvement
is necessary to supplement police efforts to reduce crime); URBAN PREDICAMENT,
supra note 8, at 215 ("primary responsibility for public safety will fall on the
citizen"); Anticrime Proposals, supra note 9, at 52 (urging that communities begin
[Vol. XII
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Many local governments have sought to reduce delinquency by
enacting nocturnal juvenile curfew ordinances which prohibit the
presence or loitering of minors of a certain age on public streets after
an established curfew hour. 19 While many states provide for the en-
actment of general curfews by state20 or local governments during
emergency situations, 2' only four states have a statewide non-
emergency juvenile curfew. 22 Eleven states specifically authorize mu-
nicipalities to enact juvenile curfews in nonemergency situations. 23 In
Anticrime Proposals, supra note 9, at 52 (urging that communities begin "neighbor-
hood walks... [a]rson watches and escort services" to reduce crime); TASK FonCE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 25 ("individuals and groups can best determine the
needs of their youth, [and] select the best available intervention method [at local
level]"); SERIOUS DELINQUENCY, supra note 7, at 60-62 (places primary responsibility
for delinquency prevention on community, noting that citizens and local organiza-
tions can and must provide resources, such as knowledge about alleged delinquents
and relationships with their parents, which cannot be supplied by government
agencies); STOTT, supra note 1, at 313 (warns that community passivity and nonin-
volvement increase delinquency and suggests that decentralization of enforcement
and administration of juvenile justice, such as with programs of reeducation and
restitution, is necessary to create greater community involvement).
19. See infra notes 41-45. See also Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.
Supp. 1242, aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964, 965-66
(1976) (Justice Marshall, dissenting from denial of certiorari, stated that question of
constitutionality of Middletown nonemergency curfew ordinance is one "of impor-
tance to thousands of towns with similar ordinances ..."); Note, Curfew Ordi-
nances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 66, 66
(1958) (increase of delinquent activity after World War II gave impetus to passage of
juvenile curfews by states and municipalities) [hereinafter cited as Nocturnal Juvenile
Crime].
20. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 29C.3 (West 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
39.409 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:329.6 (West 1974); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 41, § 15B (1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 10.31 (West 1981);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-6(a) (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1321.1 (West
1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-7-10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-2-
114(3)(A) (Supp. 1983); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 6889-7, § 8 (g)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-
1983). For information on a governor's power to declare a state of emergency, see
generally Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Bases of Governor's Emergency
Powers, 64 MICH. L. REV. 290 (1965).
21. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8634 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 870.045(1) (West 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-17-3 (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 542.220 (Vernon 1953); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 209(m) (McKinney 1974); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 66.325 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
22. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2371 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-2 (Burns Supp. 1983); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.730 -
.754 (West Stpp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 419.710 -.760 (1981). See infra note
45 for a depiction of relevant curfew provisions in chart form.
23. See Aniz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-251 (1977 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 7-148(f)(iii) (West 1972 & Supp. 1983-1984); IDAHO CODE § 50-308 (1980);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-1-5 (Smith-Hurd 1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-
2(d) (Burns Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23B, § 22 (1)(16) (1981); N.H. REV.
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other states, these ordinances are passed pursuant to the city's home
rule powers. 24 Preemption problems have arisen as a result of misap-
propriation of curfew authority by municipal officials. 5
During times of civil disorder, statutes provide for the exercise of
emergency powers by the state, 26 and in some instances, by local
STAT. ANN. § 31-43 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:16.4 (West 1979): O. REV. STAT. §
419.740 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2151 (1975); VA. CODE § 15.1-514 (1981).
24. See, e.g., Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV, art. 5, § 45.03 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Los ANGELES CURFEW]. The curfew was enacted pursuant to the
state constitution's home rule provision. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 7 (West Supp. 1984)
("A county or city may makeand enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary,
and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws").
A municipal "home rule" provision refers to a "[c]onstitutional provision or type of
legislative action which results in providing local cities and towns with a measure of
self government if such local government accepts terms of the state legislation."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONAnY 660 (5th ed. 1979). For a discussion of municipal home rule
charters, see Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 \VM. &
MARY L. REV. 269, 273 (1968) (defining "legislative home rule" as the situation where
the "state legislature, in the absence of constitutional provision, empowers munici-
palities to adopt and exercise home rule powers"); GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA, s1pra
note 1, at 141 (mentions recent liberal judicial interpretation in some states of extent
of a city's home rule powers), W. VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 108 (2d ed.
1980) (discussing the vague grants of power from a state to a local government,
creating an "imperium in imperio," also referred to as an "absolute home rule,"
situation which creates a crucial role for judicial interpretation).
25. See Municipal Court, Fort Lauderdale v. Patrick, 254 So. 2d 193, 194-95
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (curfew established by mayor held unenforceable where
state law required municipality's legislative body to enact such ordinances and
establish penalties); State v. Gauthier, 263 La. 678, 682, 269 So. 2d 204, 206 (1972)
(emergency curfew enacted by mayor contrary to state law which required city's
chief law enforcement officer to promulgate such curfews held void); \Valsh v. River
Rouge, 385 Mich. 623, 625, 640, 189 N.W.2d 318, 319, 326 (1971) (emergency
curfew enacted by mayor during race riots at local high school was void, as power to
declare local state of emergency belonged solely to governor under state law). Com-
pare In re Michael G., 99 Misc. 2d 699, 700-01, 416 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1017-18
.(Rockland County Fam. Ct. 1979) (juvenile defendant's charge of resisting arrest
after being stopped for violating curfew dismissed because of state law that juveniles
can be arrested only for committing act which would constitute crime or felony had
it been committed by adult); with In re Carpenter, 31 Ohio App. 2d 184. 190, 195,
287 N.E.2d 399, 403, 406 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (Columbus truancy ordinance
upheld; coturt noted that state compulsory school attendance laxw was not contrary).
26. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-21-20 (1975 & Supp. 1983): ALASKA STAT. §
26.20.040 (1978); CAL. Cov'T CODE § 8558 (\Vest 1980 & Supp. 1983): CA. CODE
ANN. § 38-3-22 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-302 (1983): NEV. REV. STAT. §
414.020 to -. 160 (1983); N.C. CEN. STAT. § 116-212 (1978): N.D. CENr. CODE § 37-
17.1-05 (1980); PA. CONS. STAr. ANN. tit. 71, § 1689.2 (Purdon 1962); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-60-3 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 33-15-18 (Allen-Smith 1977): VA.
CODE § 44-146.17 (1981); W.VA. CODE § 15-5-6 (1976).
520 [Vol. XII
NONEMERGENCY CURFEWS
governments. 27 Statewide loitering or vagrancy laws are also preva-
lent and very similar in purpose and language to some juvenile curfew
ordinances. 28 While both general curfews and juvenile curfews en-
acted during emergency situations by municipalities have been upheld
in federal29 and state decisions,30 in those situations where emergencies
27. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-311(1) (1977 & Supp. 1983); CAJ, COV'T CODE §
8630 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 7721-7722 (1983); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-1504(a) (1981): FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.043 (West 1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 50-901 (1980 & Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39.416 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 12.29 (West 1977): MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-4302 (1983): NElR.
REV. STAT. § 16-227 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-17(11) (1971); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40:48-1(6) (1967 & Supp. 1983-1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166 A-8 (1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-10 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.49 (1976); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-60-8 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-29-17 (Allen-Smith 1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-5a-6 (Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-103 (1977). See 14 Die
in Miami Riot; Arson and Looting Persist for 2d Day, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1980, at
Al, col. 6 (dusk to dawn curfew enacted in Miami to quell severe racial riots).
28. See ALA. CODE § 13-A-11-9 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2914 (1977 & Supp.
1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970 & Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
9-112 (1973 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1321(6) (1979 & Supp. 1982);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3302(7) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021 (West 1976); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-36 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4108 (1981); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:107(7) (West 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 581 (1982); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 272, § 53 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.725 (West Supp. 1983): Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-35-37 (1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-4304 (1983); NER. REV.
STAT. § 15-257 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:6 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40:48-1 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-10 (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35
(McKinney 1980); OnHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.11(A)(4) (1982); OR. REV. STAT. §
166.045 (1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5506 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAwS § 11-9-11 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-302 (1982): UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
9-703 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3901 (1974): WIS. STAT. ANN. § 346.29 (West
1971).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 943 (1971) (defendant's conviction for violating city of Leville's emergency
curfew upheld). The emergency in Chalk involved high school race riots where
windows were broken, police cars overturned, and persons injured. 441 F.2d at 1282.
The court warned, however, that an emergency curfew is justified only "when local
law enforcement is no longer able to maintain order and protect lives and property."
Id. at 1280. See also American Civil Liberties Union v. Chandler, 458 F. Supp. 456,
458 (W.D. Tenn. 1978) (district court upheld curfew ordinance imposed by mayor
after he had declared local state of emergency during policemen's strike). The Chan-
dler court noted that "[t]here can be no question that, in ordinary circumstances, the
imposition of a general curfew would unconstitutionally abridge rights guaranteed
bv the first amendment." 458 F. Supp. at 461. Accord Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp.
303 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (city of Eatonton's curfew ordinance held unconstitutional). In
Ruff, the court found that such curfews are constitutional only where "there is some
real and immediate threat to the public safety which cannot be adequately met
through less drastic alternatives and Where the curfew itself is tailored in duration
and application so as to meet the specific crises without unnecessary infringement of
individual liberties." 438 F. Supp. at 306. Accord Peters v. Breier, 322 F. Supp.
1171, 1172 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (court upheld Milwaukee curfew ordinance designated
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have not existed the courts have struggled with the constitutional
issues raised by the curfews and frequently held such ordinances to be
unconstitutional. 3'
Nonemergency juvenile curfew ordinances are often enacted, or an
existing curfew amended, as part of an anti-crime initiative in re-
sponse to public discontent expressed after local incidents of crime. 32
for particular municipal park and stressed fact that curfew was narrow in scope, as
opposed to general municipal-wide ordinance).
30. See, e.g., People v. McKelvy, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 1035, 100 Cal. Rptr.
661, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (court upheld conviction of defendant under San
Bernardino emergency curfew enacted during race riots of August, 1970; court
commented that -[f]reedom of movement is a fundamental right and its exercise may
be restricted only where necessary to further the most compelling state interest");
State v. Boles, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22, 27, 240 A.2d 920, 924 (1967) (defendant's
conviction under emergency curfew upheld; court sarcastically commented that
disjointed social times were such that large cities not having riots were deemed to be
apathetic); Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556, 561 (D.C. 1969) (court
upheld defendant's conviction under emergency curfew, situation being such that
city had requested federal troop intervention); Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate For
Ocean City, 236 Md. 548, 551, 204 A.2d 688, 690 (1964) (court upheld defendant's
conviction for violating Labor Day weekend juvenile curfew at beach resort city
which suffered from nearly riotous conditions during that weekend); State v. Dob-
bins, 277 N.C. 484, 496, 178 S.E.2d 449, 456 (1971) (court upheld defendant's
conviction under emergency curfew, emphasizing that curfew was temporary and
that "clear and present" danger existed at time); Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 201-
02, 163 N.W.2d 207, 211 (1968) (court upheld conviction of defendant tinder emer-
gency curfew ordinance and commented that "temporary imposition of a Curfew,
limited in time and reasonably made necessary by conditions prevailing, is a legiti-
mate and proper exercise of the police power of public authority"). Contra People v.
Kearse, 58 Misc. 2d 277, 280, 295 N.Y.S.2d 192, 195 (Onondaga County Ct. 1968)
(Syracuse curfew ordinance enacted pursuant to emergency powers provided by state
law held "per se unenforceable" as it failed to provide for any exceptions, even for
emergency vehicles).
For a description of the emergency situations that existed when some of these
curfews were enacted, see State v. Chandler, 98 N.J. Super. 241, 243, 236 A.2d 632,
634 (Essex County Crim. Ct. 1967) (court took judicial notice of state of emergency
which had been declared in Newark in July, 1967, such that "[g]un battles were
waged on the streets and in houses . . . ," and general curfew imposed on city by
governor); A & B Auto Stores v. City of Newark, 106 N.J. Super. 491, 507-14, 256
A.2d 110, 119-22 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969) (racial problems leading to urban riots
in late 1960's discussed). See also Comment, The Riot Curfew, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 450,
487 (1969) (referring to riot curfew as "drastic device" constitutionally justified only
where state has "compelling reason") [hereinafter cited as Riot CurJew].
31. See W.J.W. v. Florida, 356 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (court
held Pensacola nonemergency curfew unconstitutional, stating that "[r]estraining
children under the age of sixteen years from freely walking upon the streets or other
public places when no emergency exists is incompatible with the freedoms of speech,
association, peaceful assembly and religion secured to all citizens. ). See also
injra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
32. See Curfew Law Sparks Battle in Detroit, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 1, 1983, at 10,
col. 1 (juvenile curfew enforced strictly after mayor speaks out against urban crime)
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This Note will examine the nonemergency juvenile curfew amend-
ments recently enacted in Trenton and Newark, New Jersey, and the
Detroit, Michigan, ordinance which has recently been strictly en-
forced as part of a publicized anticrime campaign. 33 This Note will
then examine the conflicting federal and state court decisions which
have considered the constitutionality of various curfew ordinances.3 4
The courts have disagreed on the construction of these curfews, on
their effectiveness in preventing juvenile delinquency and on the bal-
ance of minors' liberty interests against the police powers of local
governments. 35 The Trenton, Newark and Detroit ordinances will be
analyzed in light of federal and state decisions which have examined
the constitutional problems of overbreadth and vagueness that such
nonemergency ordinances have raised.3 6
This Note will suggest that even a carefully drafted nonemergency
juvenile curfew, such as the Model Curfew Ordinance, 37 unduly in-
fringes upon a minor's liberty interests protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 38 This Note concludes that state
or local governments should be given the power to enact curfews and
other measures only in emergency situations. Should the delinquency
problem in nonemergency situations prove overly difficult to control,
local governments should also be empowered to enact a properly
drafted loitering ordinance, such as one based on the Model Penal
[hereinafter cited as Curfew Law Sparks Battle]. Public outrage at particular crimi-
nal acts can lead to publicized political exhortations for crime reduction measures.
See Shenon, Morgenthau Urges End to Nighttime 'Superstar' Concerts in Central
Park, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1984, at B1, col. 1. The Manhattan District Attorney was
speaking in reference to a July 22, 1983 Central Park concert. After the concert,
youth gangs committed robberies and muggings in the park and streets nearby.
Forty-nine arrests were made, twenty-seven of which resulted in felony charges. See
also Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act: Effectiveness and Impact on the New York
Juvenile Justice System, 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 677, 685 (1981) (public perceptions
of lenient juvenile punishments gave impetus for harsher penalties under New York
act) [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Offender Act].
33. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 102-24, 186 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of differing
judicial construction of these ordinances; infra note 186 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the effectiveness of juvenile curfews; and infra notes 116, 181-85 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing of state interests against a minor's
liberty interests.
36. See infra notes 125-34, 151-58 and accompanying text.
37. See NAT'L INST. OF MUN. LAW OFFICERS, MODEL ORDINANCE SERVICE 7-400.1
to -400.4 (Rhyne ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ORDINANCE]; infra note 199
for a chart depicting relevant provisions of this proposed juvenile curfew ordinance.
38. See infra notes 159-93 and accompanying text.
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Code draft, which would enhance law enforcement agencies' efforts
in preventing delinquency without unduly infringing upon a minor's
liberty interests. 39
II. Current Nonemergency Juvenile Curfew Ordinances
Nonemergency 40 curfew ordinances applicable only to minors are in
effect in such major cities as Los Angeles, 4' Chicago, 42 San Fran-
cisco, 43 and St. Louis. 44 Little variation exists among the ordinances
concerning the age of minors covered by the curfew or the hour at
which the curfew takes effect. 45 There is, however, a more substantial
39. See infra notes 194-211 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 22 for statewide nonenergency curfew ordinances; supra note
23 for state statutes allowing municipalities to enact nonemergency curfews. The
City of Philadelphia is unique in that in 1977 it enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance
of unspecified duration pursuant to a council declaration of an "emergency" in the
city. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 10-301(1)(a) (1977) ("[a]n emergency has been
created by a substantial increase in the number and seriousness of crimes committed
by minors ... and this has created a menace to the preservation of public peace,
safety, health, morals and welfare. ) [hereinafter cited as PHILADELPHIA CUR-
FEW].
41. See Los ANGELES CURFEW, supra note 24, § 45.03.
42. CHICAGO, ILL., ORDINANCES § 190-2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO
CURFEW].
43. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE art. 8, § 539 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
SAN FRANCISCO CURFEW].
44. ST. Louis, Mo., ORDINANCES § 15.110.010 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ST.
Louis CURFEW].
45. See chart below. The numbers in the exceptions column represent the follow-
ing situations where the minor is held to be exempt from the ordinance:
(1) when accompanied by a parent or guardian
(1 +) or when accompanied by another adult approved by the parents:
(2) when on an emergency errand;
(3) when directly going to or coming from a meeting, school or religious activity
(3 + ) provided that prior notice is given the municipality or prior approval is given
to an organization holding such an activity;
(4) when going or coming directly from lawful employment;
(5) when undertaking his or her parent's lawful business;
(6) when authorized by a permit from the sheriff or mayor;
(7) when immediately in front of house or apartment;
(8) when accompanied by his or her spouse
(8 +) who is over twenty-one years old;
(9) when emancipated from his or her parents,
(10) when traveling in a motor vehicle or when traveling interstate.
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difference in the number and type of exceptions where the curfew will
not apply. For example, the Los Angeles and Chicago curfews can be
considered "strict" in the sense that there are only two possible situa-
tions listed in each ordinance where a minor might be on the streets
without violating the law.4" In both cities, a minor who is accompa-
nied by a parent or legal guardian is exempted.47 In Los Angeles, a
minor on a public street after the curfew hour is exempted by the
ordinance if accompanied by his or her spouse, if the spouse is over the
City or Age: Less Wording of
State Than . . . Day-Times Prohibition Exceptions
Los Angeles 18 All: 10 pm- "loiter" 1, 8 +
sunrise
Chicago 17 Su-Th 11:30 "present at 1 +, 4
p.m.-6:00 a.m.; or upon"
Fri, Sa 10:30
p.m.-6:00 a.m.
San Fran. 18 All: 11:00 p.m.- "in or on" 1+, 3, 4
6:00 a.m.
St. Louis 17 Su-Th 11:00 p.m.- "loiter, idle, 1 +, 2, 3, 4
6:00 a.m.; Fri, wander, stroll" 5
Sa 12:00-6:00 a.m.
Ind. 17 Sa, Su 1-5:00 a.m.; "to be in" 1+, 3, 4
Su-Th 11:00 p.m.-
5:00 a.m.
Ill. 17 Sa, Su 12:01-6:00 -'present at 1 +, 4
a.m.; Su-Th 11:00 or upon"
p.m.-6:00 a.m.
Mich. 16 All: 12:01-6:00 "loiter, idle 1 +, 5
a.m. or congregate"
Ore. 18 All: 12:01-4:00 "in or upon" 1 +, 5, 9
a. m.
Chart compiled by author from statutes and ordinances cited supra, notes 22, 24, 41-
44. See also infra note 103 for a chart depiction of nonemergency curfew provisions
considered by state and federal courts, and the Newark, Trenton and Detroit curfew
ordinances.
46. See infra note 103 for other examples of "strict" juvenile curfew ordinances.
The connotation of "strict" exists for the purpose of the discussion herein.
47. See Los ANGELES CURFEW, supra note 24, § 45.03(a); CHICAGO CURFEW, supra
note 42, § 190-2. This juvenile curfew exception is common to virtually all non-
emergency curfews. See supra note 45 and infra note 103 for depictions of this and
other curfew exceptions.
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age of twenty-one.48 In Chicago, a minor may legally appear in public
after the curfew period begins if he is engaged in an occupation or
business. 49
The curfew ordinances in San Francisco and St. Louis can be
considered "less strict" because additional exceptions are provided. 50
Both ordinances foresee the possibility of a minor's appearing in pub-
lic after the curfew period by permission of the minor's parents. 51 The
St. Louis curfew also exempts minors on emergency errands,5 2 and the
San Francisco ordinance allows exceptions for minors returning from
nighttime social events with parental permission..5 1
Federal and state courts which have reviewed juvenile curfew ordi-
nances have found the number and type of exceptions provided by the
measures to be crucial constitutional characteristics. 54 Earlier state
court decisions placed importance on the exact wording of the ordi-
nances. 15 Although recent court decisions56 have placed less weight on
statutory language, the precise wording of the curfews nevertheless
affects their constitutionality. The St. Louis curfew, for example,
makes it unlawful for a minor to "loiter, idle, wander, or stroll" in
public after the curfew hour. 57 This language is similar to that con-
tained in the city loitering ordinance held to be unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.58
A. Trenton, Newark and Detroit Curfew Ordinances
Detroit, Newark and Trenton have recently revived or amended
their nonemergency juvenile curfews. 59 The most restrictive ordinance
48. Los ANGELES CURFEW, supra note 24, § 45.03(a).
49. CHICAGO CURFEW, supra note 42, § 190-2.
50. See supra note 103 for other examples of "less strict" nonemergency curfews
which have been considered by state and federal courts.
51. See ST. Louis CURFEW, supra note 44, § 15. 110.010; SAN FRANCISCO CURFEW,
supra note 38, § 539(a).
52. See ST. Louis CURFEW, supra note 44, § 15.110.010.
53. See SAN FRANCISCO CURFEW, supra note 43, § 539(a).
54. See supra notes 105-08, 123-34 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 102, 122-24 and accompanying text. For example, courts
distinguished between the "mere presence" type of curfew, such as the Chicago and
San Francisco prohibitions exemplify, supra notes 42 & 43, and the "remaining or
loitering" type of curfew, which the Los Angeles and St. Louis curfews represent,
supra notes 41 & 44.
56. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp 1242, 1252 (M.D. Pa.
1975), aJJ'd inem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976)
(ordinances using both types of restrictive language will be enforced identically in
practice).
57. ST. Louis CURFEW, supra note 44, § 15.110.010.
58. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). See inJra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 59-64, 125, 153-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Detroit ordinance; infra notes 65-69, 129-30, 151-52 and accompanying text for a
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is found in Detroit.60 This curfew was originally enacted as an emer-
gency measure in 1976 and then adopted as an ongoing ordinance. 6'
After the city suffered a sharp increase in crime in early 1983, the
Mayor announced that the curfew would be strictly enforced by the
Detroit Police Department. 62 This enhanced enforcement created
discussion of the Newark ordinance; infra notes 70-72, 131-34, 156-58 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the Trenton ordinance.
60. DETROIT, MICH., CITY CODE § 36-3-1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DETROIT
CURFEW]. See generally Note, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76
MICH. L. REV. 109 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Juvenile Curfew]. The ordinance
contains two exceptions:
The provisions of this Article do not apply to: (a) a minor accompanied by
his or her parent, legal guardian or other adult person having the care or
custody of the minor; or (b) a minor going to or returning from work:
provided that the minor's hours of employment do not violate State Law;
provided further that the minor possesses a signed statement issued by his
or her employer within the previous 90 days setting forth the minor's hours
of employment; and provided further that such minor shall be exempt
from the requirements of this Article for not more than one hour before
the minor's work day begins and for not more than one hour after the
minor's work day ends.
DETaOIT CURFEW, § 36-3-5. For a comparison of the three sample ordinances and
their respective curfew exceptions, see infra note 92, where the Detroit curfew is
contrasted to other "strict" curfews which have been considered by state and federal
decisions.
The city of Detroit has recently been beset with economic problems that include a
17% unemployment rate and a population with nearly 30% of its residents living
below the poverty level. Holusha, After 10 Years in Office, Detroit Mayor Has Firm
Hold on City, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1984, at A22, col. 1. The youth unemployment
rate is over 50%. Peterson, Youth Curfew in Detroit Stirs Emotional Debate, N.Y.
Times, July 13, 1983, at A7, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Youth Curfew]. In 1982, the
city's population was 1,181,868, with a U.C.R Crime Index total of 152,962, which
includes 513 murders and non-negligent manslaughters. U.C.R., supra note 1, at
355.
61. See Juvenile Curfew, supra note 60, at 109 (city had serious gang problems
during summer of 1976); Youth Curfew, supra note 60 (emergency arose when youth
gangs attacked group of concert-goers in downtown area in August, 1976).
62. Youth Curfew, supra note 60, at A7. From January to May, 1983, the
number of charges filed against juveniles increased 13%, and the number of serious
crimes reported from January to March increased 11.2% from the previous year, to
60,080. T. Demchak & A. Smith, Detroit Curfew Limits Juveniles, Youth Law
News, July-Aug., 1983, at 1, col. 1.
Mayor Young's anti-crime initiatives were prompted by an incident which left
three bystanders dead. Detroit Mayor's night curfew for teenagers draws praise, San
Francisco Examiner & Chronicle, July 24, 1983, at A8, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Detroit Mayors night curfew]. Upon announcing the nonemergency juvenile curfew,
the Mayor issued a stern warning to the youth of Detroit: "I want to make one thing
very clear to everyone-if you mess up, we will nail you." Detroit Initiates Teen
Curfew, JUVENILE JUSTICE DIGEST, July 11, 1983, at 10.
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public controversy 3 and prompted a legal challenge of the curfew. 64
Similar controversy 5 surrounded the recent amendment of the
Newark juvenile curfew ordinance. 66 Three changes were made in the
ordinance for the avowed purpose of making the curfew easier to
enforce and more likely to withstand the anticipated constitutional
challenges67 : (1) the age of the restricted minor was lowered from
eighteen to thirteen; (2) the later summer-time curfew hour was
eliminated; and (3) a new exception allowing a minor to lawfully
remain within 100 yards of his or her residence during curfew hours
63. See Flaherty, Curfew Law Sparks Battle in Detroit, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 1, 1983,
at 10, col. 1 ("[ilt may make the job of the police easier if the kids are off the street,
but it would also be easier if everyone were off the streets"; "[p]olice convenience is
no reason to violate constitutional rights") (emphasis in original) (quoting Howard L.
Simon, executive director of the Michigan American Civil Liberties Union). But see
Detroit Mayor's night curfew, supra note 55, at A8, col.1 (noting that Chamber of
Commerce and major labor unions have supported curfew).
64. See People v. Smith, No. U-107466 (Detroit Dist. Ct. 1983). The defendant
was seventeen years old when arrested in June, 1983 for violating the Detroit curfew
ordinance. He was arrested while outside a local arcade at 1:05 a.m. with tb.ree
friends, all of whom were over eighteen. Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Quash the Complaint, People v. Smith, No. U-107466 (De-
troit Dist. Ct. 1983). Recently, the defendant was aquitted of the charges; therefore,
he may no longer appeal the constitutionality of the ordinance. Telephone interview
with Professor Edward Wise, Wayne State University Law School, General Counsel
to the Michigan Civil Liberties Union (Jan. 5, 1984).
65. See Newark City Council Minutes, Regular Meeting, 9-12 (Jan. 4, 1984) (city
residents appeared and voiced opposition to juvenile curfew amendment) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Newark City Council Minutes] (minutes of all relevant meetings are
available in Fordham University Law School Library).
66. NEWARK, N.J. REV. ORDINANCES tit. 17, ch. 2, § 4, (1984) [hereinafter cited as
NEWARK CURFEW]. In part, the nonemergency ordinance states:
It shall be unlawful for any minor under the age of 13 years to loiter, idle,
wander, stroll or play in, or remain in or be upon the public streets,
highways, roads, alleys, parks, playgrounds, wharves, docks or other pub-
lic grounds, public places and public buildings, places of amusement and
entertainmenit, vacant lots or other public places within the confines of the
city or to be more than 100 yards from his or her place of residence
between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. of the following day. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any minor accompanied
[sic] by his parent, guardian or other adult person having care or custody
of the minor, or where the minor is upon an emergency errand or legiti-
mate business directed by his parent or guardian, or other adult person
having the care or custody of the minor.
The Newark City Council presented the ordinance to the mayor on Jan. 5, 1984. It
was returned Jan. 19, and became law on Feb. 8, 1984. NEWARK CURFEW, supra.
67. See Narvaez, New Curfews on Youths Due in Jersey, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3,
1984, at B5, col. 1 ("[t]he old law was completely unenforceable... try[ing] to have
a curfew for 18 year olds was ludicrous"; "[n]ow we will have a law we can enforce")
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was added.68 The ordinance was passed unanimously by the Newark
City Council with statements of praise and little reservation. 9
The recently amended nonemergency curfew in Trenton is the most
carefully drafted and extensively detailed of the three ordinances,
containing twelve exceptions wherein a minor may lawfully be
present in public after the curfew period begins." The Trenton City
(quoting Councilman Tucker, sponsor of Newark ordinance) [hereinafter cited as
New Curfews].
68. NEWARK CURFEW, supra note 66.
69. Newark City Council Minutes, supra note 65, at 11-12. Various comments by
council members paraphrased by the stenographer include: "[t]his Council is not
trying to interfere with anyone's right" (Councilman Rice); "[t]he curfew ... will
eliminate the criminals of tomorrow" (Councilwoman Villani); '*[t]he essence of the
ordinance is not to punish children but to protect children" (Councilman Tucker).
Id. Contra, Telephone interview with Deborah Karpatkin, Esq., New Jersey Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union (Jan. 27, 1984) (council failed to realize that, in many
urban areas, minors as young as thirteen years old may have significant responsibili-
ties, such as babysitting, shopping and cooking, in families where both parents work,
or in single parent families, and may have legitimate reasons for being in public after
10:00 p.m.). Ms. Karpatkin appeared before the Newark City Council meeting of
Jan. 4, 1984 to voice the American Civil Liberties Union's opposition to the curfew.
Newark City Council Minutes, supra at 9.
70. See TRENTON, N.J., ORDINANCES § 83-134 (1983) [hereinafter cited as TREN-
TON CURFEW]. The curfew was first read at the October 25, 1983 meeting and'
adopted after the second reading at the December 15, 1983 meeting by a 6 to 1
margin. Trenton City Council Minutes, Regular Meeting, 2-3 (Dec. 15, 1983). In
part, the juvenile curfew ordinance states:
It shall be unlawful for any person sixteen (16) years of age or younger
(under seventeen (17)) to be or remain in or upon the streets within the
City of Trenton at night during the period ending at 5:00 A.M. and
beginning: (a) At 11:59 P.M. on Friday and Saturday nights, and (b) at
10:00 P.M. on all other nights; provided that during the period commenc-
ing June 15 and ending on the first Monday of September (Labor Day)
inclusive, the beginning hours provided in subsection (a) shall be applica-
ble to all nights of the week.
TRENTON CURFEW, supra § 3.
The exceptions to the curfew restriction include those situations where the minor
is: (a) accompanied by a parent or (b) authorized adult; (c) exercising first amend-
ment rights after first delivering a signed communication to the police: (d) present
after curfew hour in cases of "reasonable necessity" where the parents of the minor
have first contacted the police; (e) on the sidewalk near his residence; (f) returning
home from a school or religious activity of which the police have prior notice; (g)
individually authorized by a police permit; (h) authorized by the police as part of a
larger group; (i) going to or returning from work; or (j) traveling in a motor vehicle
in Trenton with his or her parent's consent. Id. § 4. The Trenton curfew closely
resembles the Middletown ordinance upheld by a district court in Bvkofskv v. Bor-
ough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp 1242, 1266-73 (M.D. Pa. 1975). See infra note 111
and accompanying text. Exceptions (c), (d), and (f) present constitutional questions
not addressed by the Bykofsky court. See supra note 116.
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Council explicitly stated that it acted in response to a "significant
breakdown in the supervision normally provided by certain parents"'
'
and the resulting increase in juvenile delinquency. The Council also
recognized the difficulties the Trenton Police Department faced in
preventing juvenile crime and stated that an additional purpose of the
curfew was to make the officers' law enforcement job easier.7 2
B. Juvenile Curfew Enforcement
Nonemergency curfews frequently contain provisions specifying the
manner in which a local police department is to enforce the ordi-
nance.7 3 The officer may be required to take any minor found to be
violating the curfew into custody, whereupon the parents will be
notified by the police74 or a representative of a special youth detention
center.75 Some ordinances allow an officer significant discretion in
choosing how to respond to a violation.76 The Philadelphia curfew
provides an officer with the option of directing the minor to proceed
71. TRENTON CURFEW, supra note 70, § 1. See also New Curfews, suipra note 67
("[w]e have to protect the kids from themselves and give them guidance"; "[w]e have
to protect them from drugs and alcohol and prevent them from damaging people's
property") (quoting Councilwoman Stubblefield, sponsor of curfew).
72. TRENTON CURFEW, supra note 70, at § 1.
73. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text. The delineation of enforcement
standards has been cited as an important factor in determining whether a curfew or
loitering ordinance is void for vagueness. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. at 156, 170 (1972) ("[w]here ... there are no standards governing the
exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and encour-
ages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law").
The crucial role of the police officer intervening with a juvenile offender has been
emphasized. TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 182 ("[t]o a large
extent, an officer's attitude and demeanor toward the juvenile will determine the
latter's view of all ensuing procedures ..."). The Task Force suggests that police
patrols should be established in areas where there are the greatest delinquency
problems in order to best fulfill their dual roles of enforcing the law and preventing
delinquency. See TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra, at 182, 197.
74. See, e.g., TRENTON CURFEW, supra note 70, § 6 (officer who determines that
curfew violation has occurred "shall take the juvenile to the police station").
75. See SAN FRANCISCO CURFEW, supra note 43, § 539(c) (minor arrested for
curfew violation "shall be taken forthwith to the Youth Guidance Center").
76. See, e.g., CHICAGO CURFEW, supra note 42 (officer is only directed to warn
child and serve written notice upon parents, as opposed to directive to issue citation
to all violators); NEWARK CURFEW, supra note 66, tit. 17, ch. 12, § 4(c) (minor who
violates curfew is only "subject to arrest"). Of the 961,918 reported juvenile offenders
who were taken into police custody in 1982, 33 % were handled within the individual
department and released, 58.1 % were referred to juvenile court jurisdiction, and
5.6% were referred to criminal court. U.C.R., supra note 1, at 242.
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home, taking the minor home himself, or taking the minor to the
police station. 77 The officer may choose the alternative which is "nec-
essary to best protect the interest of the minor and the community. "78
It may be necessary for the local police department to enunciate
enforcement procedures where a juvenile curfew fails to specify such
rules. The Los Angeles Police Department 79 has issued an order of
operations 80 concerning curfew arrest procedures which sets forth
guidelines and allows for substantial police discretion. An officer is
directed to give at least a fifteen minute warning to a juvenile prior to
a curfew violation arrest under most circumstances. 8' Special arrest
reports are also required in which the officer must specify the actual
warning period provided, the facts leading to the arrest and the local
problems with juvenile crime in the area.8 2
Municipal police departments frequently recognize the practical
problems of insufficient manpower and community support in enforc-
ing nonemergency juvenile curfews. 83 Consequently, juvenile curfews
77. Philadelphia, Bill No. 265 (Oct. 10, 1980) (amending § 10-306(b)), § 10-
306(b).
78. Id.
79. The Los Angeles Police Department consisted of 6,861 officers in 1982.
U.C.R., supra note 1, at 256. This compares with the totals for the Trenton Police
Department (354 officers), the Newark Police Department (1,166 officers) and the
Detroit Police Department (4,092 officers). Id. at 276, 285, 289. In general, cities
having a population of at least 250,000 had an average of 3.3 police department
employees (including officers) for every 10,000 citizens, compared with a 2.3 average
for cities with less than 10,000 persons. Id. at 245.
80. Office of Operations, Order No. 37, Los Angeles Police Dep't (Aug. 27, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Los Angeles Police Order]. The order was issued in part because
of the failure of some prior juvenile arrests to be successfully prosecuted by the
District Attorney's office due to incomplete arrest reports or other problems. See
People v. Teresinski, - Cal. 3d -, 144 Cal. Rptr. 257, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978),
vacated, 26 Cal. 3d 457, 162 Cal. Rptr. 44, 605 P.2d 874 (1980), vacated, 449 U.S.
914 (1980) (defendant's conviction under city of Dixon's juvenile curfew reversed due
to officer's incorrect application of "loitering" type of curfew to juvenile who was
merely present in public when arrested).
81. Los Angeles Police Order, supra note 80, at 3. The only recognized exceptions
to this prior warning requirement are where the endangerment of the minor or the
danger to the community require an immediate arrest of the juvenile without giving
him prior notice to return home. Telephone interview with Officer Slocombe, L.A.
Police Dep't, Juvenile Div. (Jan. 23, 1984). Officer Slocombe noted that groups of
juveniles in Los Angeles had created problems with local community groups and
merchants, pressuring the police to curb youth congregations and loitering. See
Lindsey, Dancing in the Streets With a Dream, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1984, at AI0,
col. 3 (police intervention during recent "break dancing" exhibition in Los Angeles
neighborhood after numerous merchant complaints).
82. Los Angeles Police Order, supra note 80, at 3.
83. See New Curfews, supra note 67, at B5, col. 1 ("[i]t's always been my
perception that enforcement of curfew ordinances are [sic] extremely difficult, given
the problems that exist in the environs of the city"; "[w]ithout a cooperative commu-
nity, curfew enforcement is almost impossible") (quoting Newark's Police Director
1984]
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are currently enforced with varying degrees of severity in different
cities. 84 In New York City, where there is no juvenile curfew ordi-
nance,85 the police department86 states that such an ordinance would
be unenforceable. 7 Juvenile daytime truancy programs, however, are
considered by some police departments to be both enforceable and
effective. 88
Hubert Williams). The head of the Youth Division of the Trenton Police Depart-
ment, Capt. Thomas S. Williams, also notes that enforcement of the juvenile curfew
occupies officers who would otherwise be working on much more serious crime
problems. Id. The overall effectiveness of crime prevention in some metropolitan
police departments, due in part to union contracts, political demands and entrenched
habit, has been noted. See URBAN PREDICAMENT, supra note 8, at 215. Alternative
enforcement methods, such as decoy patrols and selective investigation methods,
have been suggested. URBAN PREDICAMENT, supra, at 215,
84. The Chicago Police Department reported 63,506 curfew violation notices to
parents in 1982, while the St. Louis Police Department reported only 1,001 such
violations in 1983. Telephone interview with Officer Radney, Chicago Police Dep't,
Pub. Affairs Div. (Jan. 23, 1984); Letter from Lt. Donald N. Spicer, St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Dep't, Juvenile Div. Commander (Jan. 25, 1984).
85. Although there is no juvenile curfew ordinance in New York City, minors
who commit criminal offenses may be subject to adult criminal penalties. New York
State has recently extended the coverage of adult criminal statutes and penalties to
children between the ages of 14 and 16 for violent crimes (i.e., robbery, burglary,
first degree assault, rape, arson and kidnapping). Juvenile Offender Act, supra note
32, at 688. The age reductions mark an end to the 16-year-old age limitation which
had existed for the previous 150 years. New York is now considered to be very strict
towards serious juvenile offenders in that "no jurisdiction, other than New York,
permits an adult criminal charge to be lodged against a person less than sixteen years
of age without at least an initial determination by the juvenile court." Id.
86. The New York City Police Department is by far the largest in the nation,
with 22,855 officers and 28,731 total department employees in 1982. U.C.R., supra
note 1, at 289.
87. Telephone interview with Lt. Butler, Youth Servs. Div., New York City
Police Dep't (Jan. 30, 1984). The special characteristics of a large city, such as the
large variety of legitimate nighttime activities, including night courses and school
sporting events, and the overwhelming magnitude of other crime prevention efforts,
have been cited as reasons for the unenforceability of a nonemergency curfew. Id. In
lieu of enforcing a curfew ordinance, the city police enforce existing ordinances
which prohibit harrassment, loitering or disorderly conduct. See Youths Harrass
People Seeking Cabs at Depots, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1984, at B1, col. 1, B4.
The paucity of legitimate nighttime activities has been mentioned in support of
nonemergency juvenile curfew ordinances. See BOROUGH OF MIDDLETOWN, PA., ORD.
No. 662, § 2(b) (1975) ("[c]ommercial recreational facilities (1 movie) are almost
nonexistent and there is little or nothing for minors to do outdoors ...-) (cquoted in
Bykofsky v. Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1267 (M.D. Pa. 1975)), TRENTON
CURFEW, supra note 70, § 1 ("[c]ommercial recreational facilities are limited and
there is little or nothing for juveniles to do outdoors but roam the streets ...");
Newark City Council Minutes, supra note 65, at 11 ("[e]vcryone acknowledges that
the City of Newark no longer has nighttime recreation for youths") (quoting Council-
man Carrino).
88. Telephone interview with Lt. Butler, Youth Services Div., New York City
Police Dep't (Jan. 30, 1984) (controlling daytime truancy violations in area such as
Times Square said to be more practicable than enforcing nighttime juvenile curfew).
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III. Constitutional Issues Raised by Nonemergency
Juvenile Curfews
A. Due Process: Overbreadth Doctrine and First Amendment
Rights
The legal challenges to nonemergency curfews have been based in
part upon an alleged violation of the plaintiff's due process rights as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 89 Once the initial jurisdic-
tional problems of standing ° and mootness 1 have been overcome,
courts have usually examined the specific provisions of the curfew
being challenged with a predisposition toward finding the ordinance
constitutional .92
See N.Y EDUC. LAW § 3213(2)(a) (McKinney 1981) ("[a] supervisor of attendance...
may arrest without warrant any minor who is unlawfully absent from attendance
upon instruction ...").
89. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1 ("[n]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law ...").
90. See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, 668 F.2d 617, 620 (1st Cir. 1982)
(court dismissed plaintiff's declaratory judgement action, holding that lower court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff had not been accused of violating curfew,
and that her complaint failed to allege "real risk that she personally will sustain a
direct injury from enforcement of the statute"). But see Naprstek v. City of Norwich,
545 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1976) (minors bringing 48 U.S.C. § 1983 action challeng-
ing juvenile curfew ordinance did have standing, though never actually accused of
violating curfew, as "[t]he ordinance clearly prohibited the plaintiffs' intended con-
duct and ... it had been applied to and enforced under circumstances in which the
plaintiffs found themselves at the time of bringing the action").
91. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981) (court
of appeals dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, appeal of plaintiff who,
though fourteen when arrested for violating city curfew, had turned seventeen prior
to court's decision and was, therefore, no longer covered by curfew). The court in
Johnson decided the merits of the case, however, based on the standing of plaintiff's
mother and the certified class consisting of "all persons who have been or in the
future will be arrested or detained .... " Id. at 1070.
The question whether the municipality itself is a proper party-defendant in 48
U.S.C. § 1983 actions challenging a nonemergency curfew ordinance was settled by
the Supreme Court in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). The Court rejected the contention that a municipality was not a "person"
within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 690. Federal cases prior to Monell held that
a city was not a proper defendant in such a section 1983 action. See, e.g., Naprstek v.
City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1976); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middle-
town, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd men., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
92. P. KAUPER & F. BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 122, 123 (5th ed. 1980)
(presumption of constitutionality is considered to be one of four most important
judicial techniques in constitutional litigation) [hereinafter cited as KAUPER & BEY-
TAGH].
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The doctrine of overbreadth 93 was utilized by the Supreme Court to
strike down a federal law which restricted the petitioner's right to
travel in Aptheker v. Secretary of State. 4 A Cincinnati ordinance
93. This Note will examine the overbreadth problems of nonemergency curfews
separately from the void-for-vagueness problems, which are discussed infra notes
135-58 and accompanying text. One author notes that, although the two doctrines
are similar in some respects, they are essentially different: "A law is 'void for
vagueness' if it fails to give adequate notice of the conduct it encompasses. A law is
overbroad if it sweeps so widely that it extends (or might be thought to extend) to
otherwise protected expression or activity and where the behavior could be reached
by a more narrowly drawn provision." KAUPER & BEYTAGH, supra note 92, at 1192.
The overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines are both closely related to the
freedoms protected by the first amendment and "have particular significance where
expressional and associational rights are concerned." Id. at 1192.
Another analysis of the overbreadth doctrine compares the "statutory" line of
conduct burdened by the challenged restriction against the "judicial" line, which
specifies conduct protected by the first amendment. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAw 710 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]. The latter line prevails where
judicially protected activities are burdened by the statute. Id. Another major differ-
ence between the two judicial doctrines is that an individual is normally permitted to
litigate on behalf of the rights of third parties when claiming that a statute is
unconstitutionally overbroad, but not when only claiming that it is void for vague-
ness. Id. at 719-20.
The close connection between the two doctrines was described by the Supreme
Court in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982):
In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's
first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial
amount of constitutional conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth
challenge must fail. The Court should then examine the facial vagueness
challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally pro-
tected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is
unconstitutionally vague in all of its applications.
Id. at 494.
94. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that section 6 of the
Subversive Activities Control Act, which made passport applications by declared
Communists unlawful, was void inder the fifth amendment due process clause.
Though the stated purpose of the provision was to protect national security, the
Court found that it was overbroad in that it "applies regardless of the purposes for
which an individual wishes to travel." Id. at 511. See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
16 (1964) (refusal of Secretary of State to validate petitioner's passport for trip to
Cuba upheld on basis of national security; Court commented that, unlike situation in
Kent, inJra, "refusal to validate appellant's passport does not result from any expres-
sion or association on his part"). The Court in Zemel also noted that a person's
freedom to travel is not absolute, as the freedom does not mean that "areas ravaged
by flood, fire or pestilence cannot be quarantined when it can be demonstated that
unlimited travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with the safety
and welfare of the Nation as a whole." Id. at 14.
For further discussion of the constitutional right to travel, see Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (state residency requirements for welfare recipients
held unconstitutional under due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth
amendment; Court stated that "[t]he nature of our Federal Union and our consitu-
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prohibiting public conduct found to be of a "manner annoying" to
police officers was similarly held unconstitutional because of over-
breadth in Coates v. Cincinnati .9 The doctrine was also cited as the
rationale in federal and state cases which have held that vagrancy9"
and loitering97 laws of states or municipalities98 were unconstitu-
tional. 99 There is significant similarity between the constitutional is-
tional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement"): Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 125, 126 (1968) (Secretary of State did not have power to refuse
passport application based on refusal to sign affidavit denying past Communist
membership; Court commented that, although right to travel is not explicitly stated
in Bill of Rights, [t]he right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which tile citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment ...
[f]reedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values"); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (cause of action exists against defendants who were accused of
conspiring to deprive black petitioners of free use of public thoroughfares, "[t]he
constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the
highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union"). See also TiME, supra
note 93, at 953-58 (right to travel is connected with freedom of expression).
95. 402 U.S. 611 (1971). The petitioners challenged their arrest under the ordi-
nance. The Court held in their favor, stating that, while a municipality has tile
power to prevent obstruction of movement on public thoroughfares and, naturally,
all conduct which is criminal, this ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad be-
cause it "authorizes punishment of constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at 614.
The Court also reiterated the constitutional limitation on the use of public opinion to
justify a challenged legislative action: "Our decisions establish that mere public
intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgment of these constitutional
freedoms." Id. at 615. See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (convictions for
disturbing the peace and obstructing public passages during extremely vocal but
orderly civil rights demonstration reversed, as no conduct had occurred which state
could constitutionally punish). 'While the Court in Cox held that tile ordinance was
unconstitutionally overbroad, it stated that a municipality does have power to "regu-
late the use of city streets and other facilities to assure the safety and convenience of
the people in their use and the concomnmitant right of the people of free speech and
assembly." Id. at 554.
96. As defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1388 (5th ed. 1979), "'vagrancv" at
common law constituted "[t]he act of going about from place to place by a person
without visible means of support, who is idle, and who though able to work for his or
her maintenance, refuses to do so, but lives without labor or on thle charitv of
others."
97. As defined in BLACK'S LAw DICTIONAiY 849 (5th ed. 1979), "loitering" means
"to be dilatory; to be slow in movement; to stand around or move slowly about. to
stand idly around; to spend time idly: to saunter, to delay; to idle; to linger- to lag
behind."
98. See supra note 28 for examples of state loitering and vagrancy statutes.
99. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1980) (Dade
County loitering law, which prohibited person's knowingly being around others
possessing or using narcotics, found unconstitutionally overbroad; court noted that
"[a]n enactment which criminalizes ordinary associational conduct not constituting a
1984]
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sues that have arisen in these cases and the issues raised by non-
emergency juvenile curfews. 100
In nonemergency juvenile curfew decisions, whether a particular
ordinance is overbroad and thereby unconstitutionally infringes upon
associational rights protected by the first amendment'0 ' depends upon
the number and type of exceptions provided for in the curfew. In
Johnson v. City of Opelousas,10 2 the curfew ordinance considered by
the Fifth Circuit only exempted from culpability minors who were
accompanied by a "parent, tutor or other reasonable adult" or who
were on an "emergency errand.' 0 3 In reversing the district court's
breach of the peace runs afoul of the First Amendment"); Territory of Hawaii v.
Anduha, 48 F.2d 171, 173 (9th Cir. 1931) (statute that made it unlawful to "loaf,
loiter or idle" held unconstitutional due to overbreadth; court noted that "'[t]he act
trenches upon the inalienable rights of the citizen to do what he will and when he
will, so long as his course of conduct is not inimicable to himself or to the general
public of which he is a part").
100. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. See also Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230
F. 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1916) (vagrancy ordinance which court upheld did not take effect
until after 11:00 p.m.). As defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (5th ed. 1979), a
"curfew" is "a law (commonly an ordinance) which imposes on people (particularly
children) the obligation to remove themselves from the streets on or before a certain
time of night."
101. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST., amend. I.
102. 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'g 488 F. Supp. 433 (W.D. La. 1980).
103. Id. at 1067 n.1. See also chart below, which depicts various curfew ordi-
nances that have been examined by federal and state courts. The "Exceptions"
column numbers are coded in accordance with explanations in supra note 45. Cur-
fews considered in the cases marked with an asterisk were found unconstitutional.
"STRICT" JUVENILE CURFEWS
Case, City Age: Wording of
and Year Less Than . . Days-Times Prohibition Exceptions
Newark, N.J. 13 All: 10:00 "to loiter" 1 +, 2, 5, 7
1984 p.m.-6:00 a.m.
Detroit 18 F, Sa 11:00 p.m.- "to be 1 +, 4
1976 6:00 a.m.; upon"
Su-Th 10:00 p.m.-
6:00 a.m.
Johnson* 17 Su-Th 11:00 "travel, loiter, 1 +, 2
Opelousas, p.m.-4:00 a.m. wander, stroll,
1981 F, Sa 1-4:00 or play in or
a.m. upon
Mosier* 18 Su-Th 10:30 "remain in or 1, 4, 5
Van Wert, p.m.-6:00 a.m. upon"
1978 F, Sa 12-6:00 a.m.
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finding that the curfew was constitutional, 10 4 the Fifth Circuit found
that the paucity of exceptions made the ordinance overbroad because
minors were prohibited from "attending associational activities such
as religious or school meetings, organized dances, and theater and
Case, City Age:




















16 All: 11:00 p.m.-
5:00 a.m.




18 All: 10:00 p.m.-
sunrise
16 All: 12-6:00 a.m.
17 All: 10:00 p.m.-
5:00 a.m.
18 All: 9:00 p.m.-
4:00 a.m.
21 All: 9:00 p.m.-
(unspecified)


















18 All: 10:00 p.m.-
5:00 a.m.
18 All: 11:00 p.m.-
6:00 a.m.
18 All: 10:00 p.m.-
6:00 a.m.












"to be upon" 1, minor's
"legitimate
excuse
























1, 3, 4, 5
1+, 2, 3
Chart compiled by author from ordinances considered in decisions discussed infra
notes 122-24, 185-93, and ordinances discussed supra notes 59-72.
104. See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'g
488 F. Supp. 433 (W.D. La. 1980).
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sporting events, when reasonable and direct travel to or from these
activities has to be made during the curfew period." 0 5 The court also
found that the city curfew violated rights of minors protected by the
state constitution, including freedoms of speech and association,
106
freedom of religion'0 7 and freedom to travel. 08 It can be inferred from
105. Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072. It is important to note that when, as here, a court
finds that the ordinance as drafted is unconstitutionally overbroad, the constitutional
infirmity may be overcome through redrafting. KAUPEr AND BEYTAGII, supra note 82,
at 1192. See also Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (curfew and
loitering ordinances both found "facially unconstitutional" due to vagueness and
overbreadth). The Ruff court noted what it considered to be the appropriate judicial
approach: " 'Rather than await a case-by-case excision of a statute's overbreadth or
vagueness through review of its application to particular conduct, which would be
needlessly time-consuming and ineffective, courts under the rubric of the over-
breadth doctrine, invalidate the statute facially so as to end its deterrence of constitu-
tionally protected activity.' " Id. at 305 (quoting from Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d
456, 459-60 (5th Cir. 1971)).
Two prerequisites for a successful overbreadth challenge exist: (1) the protected
activity must be a significant aspect of the restriction; and (2) there must be no
"satisfactory way of severing the law's constitutional from its unconstitutional appli-
cations" so as to render the law valid. TRBE, supra note 93, at 711. Where the
protected activity does not involve first amendment freedoms, the plaintiff may be
required to show that the challenged ordinance creates a "substantial" overbreadth
problem. Id. at 712-13.
106. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072; accord Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
639 (1968) (statute prohibiting sale of pornographic materials to person known to be
minor under seventeen upheld, as state properly concluded that exposure to such
materials "might be harmful" to children); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (minors' first amendment rights of freedom of
expression were violated by school board where students were suspended for wearing
black armbands to protest Vietnam Var).
Concerning the associational rights of minors protected by the first amendment,
the Johnson court made an analogy between the nonemergency curfew ordinance
and ordinances which regulate minors' use of pinball and video games, noting that
the latter do not restrict liberties as seriously as do the curfew ordinances. Johnson,
658 F.2d at 1071 n.8; accord Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d
1029 (5th Cir. 1980) (city ordinance which prohibited minors from using video games
at any time held to be unconstitutionally overbroad). The Supreme Court remanded
Aladdin's to the court of appeals to determine whether the Fifth Circuit's decision
had been based on the Texas or the United States Constitution. 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
If the state constitution was the basis of the decision, the Court could not review the
circuit court's interpretation of state law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). 455 U.S. at
292. The circuit court had noted that there was no compelling state interest that
warranted the restraint placed on the protected associational rights of minors. Id. at
1042. See also Ranii, Pac-Man Meets Lawman, Nat'l L. J., May 23, 1983, at 1, col. I
(discussion of conflict in state court decisions concerning constitutionality of these
ordinances and issue whether use of the games constitutes activity protected by
freedom of speech).
107. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072; accord West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (school board regulation imposing penalties on stu-
dents and parents where Jehovah Witness child refused to salute flag was unconstitu-
tional infringement of minor's and parents' freedom of religion).
108. See supra note 94.
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dictum that a more narrowly drawn juvenile curfew with a greater
number of exceptions might also be found unconstitutional. 0 9
The Johnson court also refused to accept or reject the type of
juvenile curfew which had been considered and upheld six years
earlier by a Pennsylvania district court in Bykojsy v. Borough of
Middletown." 0 In addition to providing exceptions to the curfew's
application when a juvenile is accompanied by a parent, guardian or
authorized adult, the Middletown ordinance considered in Bykofsky
provided nine other exceptions from the curfew: (1) when a minor is
exercising first amendment rights and had submitted a signed writing
to the sheriff's office specifying when, where and how he or she will
be out in public after the curfew hour; (2) when a "reasonable neces-
sity" exists and the parents have first notified the police; (3) when the
minor is on a sidewalk in front of his home; (4) when the minor is
directly returning home from a school or religious activity and prior
notice was given the police; (5) when authorized by a special individ-
ual permit from the mayor; (6) when authorized by-a-group permit;
(7) when the minor has a current employment card signed by the
Chief of Police; (8) when the minor is traveling in a motor vehicle
with his parent's consent; and (9) when so ordered formally by the
mayor for groups of minors or all minors seventeen years of age or
over."' The ordinance also described police enforcement proce-
dures," 2 the liability of parents who knowingly allow their children to
109. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072, 1074 ("less drastic means [than the non-
emergency curfew] are available . . ." to combat juvenile delinquency). The court
made direct mention of the decision in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.
Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd iner., 535 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 964 (1976), when stating: "We express no opinion on [the] validity of
curfew ordinances narrowly drawn to accomplish proper social objectives." Id. at
1072. The court reserved judgment on this issue because appellants failed to chal-
lenge the city's authority to enact any juvenile curfew and limited their litigation to
the existing ordinance. Id. at 1074.
110. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
111. Id. at 1269-70, §§ 5(c)-(k) (quoting Boroucii OF MIDDLETOWN, PA., ORD. 662
(1975)).
112. Id. at 1271. Section 7 of the ordinance states that the officer shall take thejuvenile violator to the police station and call his or her parents. The police will
interrogate the parents, so as to ascertain if they knowingly or negligently allowed
their child to be present in public after the curfew hour. The officer does have
discretion, however, to deliver the juvenile directly to the parents under "appropriate
circumstances." Id. All officers must complete a written report within 24 hours after
the violation. If a parent fails to come for his or her child, the child shall be
transferred to the juvenile authorities. Id.
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be upon the streets after the designated curfew hour," 3 and the mone-
tary penalties involved.
1 4
In upholding the constitutionality of the Middletown juvenile cur-
few, the district court rejected appellants' contention that the curfew
was overbroad and violated their first amendment rights." 5 The court
held it was not an unconstitutional prior restraint to require the minor
to notify borough officials of his intention to exercise his first amend-
ment rights after the curfew hour, and "restrict[ed] only slightly first
amendment rights of assembly, association, and free expres-
sion .... 116 In addition, the minor's right to travel arguably is not
113. Id. at 1271. Section 6 of the ordinance makes it unlawful for parents to
knowingly or negligently allow their child to be upon the streets in violation of the
curfew. The purpose of this added liability is to "keep neglectful or careless parents
up to a reasonable community standard of parental responsibility." Id.
114. Id. at 1271-72. Section 8 of the nonemergency curfew provides for fines of
$25, $50 and $75, respectively, for each parental violation of Section 6. In addition,
where the minor violates the curfew four times, he or she will be turned over to the
juvenile justice authorities. Id.
115. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
116. Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1258. Contra Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072 ("[i]t is
clear that these rights of minors in Opelousas currently are being burdened by that
city's juvenile curfew ordinance"). The Bykofsky court's lack of emphasis on the
restrictive effects of the Middletown curfew seems to run counter to the Supreme
Court's emphasis on the importance of free movement in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972), discussed inJra notes 138-41 and accompany-
ing text.
The curfew exceptions which require a minor to obtain prior approval before
exercising first amendment rights by submitting a written and signed communication
to the sheriff raise the issue of the constitutionality of a prior restraint of protected
activity. See Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 611, 616 (1976)
(municipal ordinance requiring advance notice to be given to local police department
for identification purposes prior to door-to-door solicitation on behalf of charity or
political campaign was void under first and fourteenth amendments; regulations in
this area " 'must be done, and the restriction applied, in such manner as not to
intrude upon the rights of free speech and free assembly' ") (quoting Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540-41 (1945)); Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 520
(1976) (striking union members did not have right to picket their employer's retail
store located within privately owned shopping center; Court, in dicta, noted that
"while a municipality may constitutionally impose reasonable time, place, and man-
ner regulations on the use of its streets and sidewalks for First Amendment purposes
. . . what a municipality may not do under the First and Fourteenth Amendments is
to discriminate in the regulation of expression on the basis of the content of that
expression . . .") (emphasis in original); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 552 (1975) (municipal theater's rejection of petitioner's application to
show "Hair" in anticipation of its alleged obscenity held to be unconstitutional prior
restraint "tinder a system lacking in constitutionally required minimal procedural
safeguards"); In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 98, 394 N.E.2d 368, 377 (C.P. Van
Wert County 1978) (juvenile curfew's requirement that all groups sponsoring night-
time functions with minors in attendance first gain Police Chief's permission was
void; overly broad and unconstitutionally vague ordinance "provides no standards at
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unduly infringed due to the exception granted in the ordinance for
interstate travel. 11
The Bykofsky court refused to rely on or even examine in detail any
of the prior state decisions that had considered nonemergency juvenile
curfews because the court found that "the particular ordinances
which were approved or rejected do not contain many features which
might serve as significant points for distinguishing the valid from the
invalid regulatory scheme.""" The court rejected the prior judicial
reasoning utilized in many state decisions" 9 which had distinguished
whether a curfew prohibited a minor's "remaining or loitering"'2 0 on
the streets as opposed to his "mere presence"'12' during the curfew
period. The court concluded instead that the two types of curfew
prohibitions were indistinguishable for all practical purposes.
22
While some state courts emphasized the distinction between a "mere
presence" and "remaining" type restriction in their analyses of
all to guide the chief of police ...[and] is an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority... "). But see People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 870, 161 P.2d
498, 503 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945) (it is not "arbitrary, unbridled or
unlimited ..." to require a minor to obtain written permit, which states minor's
name, height and description, in order to legally appear in public after curfew period
begins).
117. Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1270, § 5(J). See supra note 94 for a discussion of
Supreme Court cases considering constitutional right to travel.
118. Id. at 1246 n.1. See chart supra note 103 for a comparison of the curfew
ordinances passed upon in Johnson, Bykofsky, and other state cases.
119. See infra note 123.
120. See supra note 103 for a description of the prohibitive language of various
juvenile curfew ordinances.
121. Id.
122. Bykofsky at 1252. The court stated that:
[W]hether the statutory language of a curfew ordinance prohibits "re-
maining" or "being" on the streets is insignificant because "remain" and
"to be" are generally given synonymous interpretations at the enforcement
level for the obvious reason they have as a practical matter in the curfew
context no intelligible difference in meaning, and a judicial determination
on this ground as to the validity of an ordinance is mere semantics and
untenable.
Id. See also People v. Chambers, 32 Ill. App. 3d 444, 447, 335 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975), rev'd, 66 Ill. 2d 36, 360 N.E.2d 55 (1976) (court, in holding curfew
void, stated that "both kinds of ordinances are likely enforced by the police as though
they prohibited the presence of juveniles on streets after the curfew"); In re Mosier,
59 Ohio Misc. 83, 87, 394 N.E.2d 368, 370 (C.P. Van Wert County 1978) (strict
enforcement of "remaining" type of curfew may lead to paradoxical situation in
which "a minor may during the prescribed hours go anywhere he pleases as long as
he stays in motion ... [t]his leads to a dilemma when he comes to a stop sign or
traffic light").
19841
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
whether a prohibition was overbroad in application, 123 both types of
restrictions have been held unconstitutional, thus giving credence to
the court's rejection of the prior narrow statutory construction analy-
sis. 124
The current Trenton, Newark and Detroit nonemergency curfew
ordinances present constitutional problems of overbreadth. The most
restrictive ordinance is found in Detroit, -which prohibits activities
such as returning from a school or a church activity after the curfew
123. See, e.g., People v. Teresinski, - Cal. 3d -, 144 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1978),
vacated, 26 Cal. 3d 457, 162 Cal. Rptr. 44, 605 P.2d 874 (1980), vacated, 449 U.S.
914 (1980) (arrest under loitering type juvenile curfew dismissed where defendant
was merely present); In re Nancy C., 28 Cal. 3d 747, 105 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1972) (arrest of minor under juvenile curfew upheld); People v. Walton, 70
Cal. App. 2d 862, 866, 161 P.2d 498, 501 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945)
(dismissal of defendant's arrest under loitering type juvenile curfew reversed; court
noted that such ordinance was simply "preventing such minors from tarrying and
staying unnecessarily upon the streets and public places, and does not restrict those
minors who are using or are on such streets or places while actually in the process of
going to or from places of business or amusement or otherwise"). See also Bykofsky,
401 F. Supp. at 1268 (section 3(d) of Middletown ordinance explicitly states that "this
is not a mere prohibitory or presence type curfew ordinance").
124. See Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial Dist., 148 Cal. App. 419, 424-25,
306 P.2d 601, 605 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (nonemergency juvenile curfew held
void due to limited number of exceptions; court noted that ordinance "would pre-
clude aimless loitering by minors in public places during the hours set forth, but it
would also make unlawful many other activities by minors which otherwise would be
entirely lawful"), W. J. W. v. State, 356 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(Pensacola juvenile curfew held void because of overbreadth; enforcement "would
make many activities unlawful which otherwise would be lawful"); In re Doe, 54
Hawaii 647, 513 P.2d 1385 (1973) (Honolulu curfew held void on overbreadth and
vagueness grounds); In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 90, 394 N.E.2d 368, 372 (C.P.
Van Wert County 1978) (City of Van Wert's juvenile curfew held void due to
overbreadth in that it prevented minors from attending nighttime functions, such as
religious services and city council meetings, which extend past curfew hour); Ex
Parte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 452, 46 S.W. 936, 937 (1898) (Graham city
juvenile curfew held void; court noted that many innocent and beneficial activities,
including socials, dances or attending "sermon or exhortation" would be punishable
after "curfew bell tolls"); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 800, 514 P.2d
1059, 1063 (1973) (municipal juvenile curfew held unconstitutional due to its failure
to distinguish between "conduct calculated to harm and that which is essentially
innocent"). The Pullman case is especially relevant in that it invalidates a juvenile
curfew that contains the greatest number of exceptions of any curfew ordinance
which has been held to be unconstitutional. See supra note 103 for a chart depicting a
number of juvenile curfew ordinances that have been reviewed by state and federal
courts. But see People v. Chambers, 66 111. 2d 36, 41, 360 N.E.2d 55, 57 (1976), rev'g
32 Il1. App. 3d 444, 335 N.E.2d 612 (1975) (state nonemergency curfew upheld by
state supreme court; court decided that first amendment rights were not unconstitu-
tionally infringed by law); City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 216,
220 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (juvenile curfew upheld; court concluded
"there is no curtailment of normal or necessary juvenile nighttime activities").
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hour. 25 In Johnson, 26 these activities were found to be constitution-
ally protected 27 and the overly restrictive juvenile curfew held void
based on the overbreadth rationale. '2" The same overbreadth problem
exists in the Newark ordinance, 29 even though the amended version
provides an additional exception which allows a minor to remain
within 100 yards of his or her residence after the curfew hour. 30
The Trenton curfew ordinance is the most carefully drafted of the
three curfews and is apparently modeled after the Middletown curfew
upheld in Bykofsky. 13' It contains all but one of the listed exceptions of
the Middletown curfew, 3 2 with minor variations in other provi-
sions. 33 Because of this similarity, the Trenton curfew would most
likely withstand a constitutional challenge based on alleged over-
breadth problems. However, such a curfew would likely be found
unconstitutional if measured against the Fifth Circuit's rationale in
Johnson.134
B. Void for Vagueness
The doctrine of void-for-vagueness 35 is closely related to the over-
breadth problem 136 because a statute containing words that are vague
may be a basis for arresting and convicting a person for acting in a
manner he reasonably thought was legal. The government has a strict
burden of clarity in legislative drafting, as "[n]o one may be required
at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of
125. DETROIT CURFEW, supra note 60.
126. Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
127. Id. at 1073.
128. Id. at 1074. See also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 66 for the text of the statute.
130. See NEWARK CURFEW, supra note 66 and accompanying text.
131. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1266-73 (M.D.
Pa. 1975), afJ'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
132. See TRENTON CURFEW, supra note 70, § 4. Provision (k) of the Middletown
curfew empowered the mayor to issue a formal rule designating certain minors or
groups of minors who were at least seventeen vears old as being excluded from the
curfew restrictions. Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1270.
133. See TRENTON CURFEW, supra note 70, § 4. For example, the Trenton curfew
extends the time allowed for a juvenile to return home from a school or religious
activity after the curfew hour from thirty minutes to one hour. Id., § 4(f).
134. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 93-134 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 93 for a definition of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. See also
Note, Constitutional Law-"Locomotion" Ordinances as Abridgement of Personal
Liberty, 32 TULANE L. REV. 117 (1957).
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penal statutes."'' 3 7 In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,'38 the Su-
preme Court held that the city vagrancy ordinance, which prohibited
in part "persons wandering or strolling around from place to place
without any lawful purpose or object . . . ,,,,19 was void because it
was unconstitutionally vague. The Court found two fatal flaws in the
ordinance: it allowed a person to be arrested for engaging in activities
which are normally innocent, 40 and it gave nearly unfettered discre-
tion to police officers in arresting persons they found merely to be
undesirable. 141
137. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (statute making "gang"
membership crime violated defendant's fourteenth amendment due process rights).
The Court stated that the word "gang" as used in the statute created a vagueness
problem because:
[T]he state court did not find, and we cannot, that "gang" has ever been
limited in meaning to a group having purpose to commit any particular
offense or class of crimes, or that it has not quite frequently been used in
reference to groups of two or more persons not to be suspected of criminal-
ity or of anything that is unlawful.
Id. at 457. See also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568 (1974) (statute which
prohibited any public act which " 'treats [American flag] contemptuously' " held to
be impermissibly vague); Smith v. Florida, 405 U.S. 172 (1972) (case challenging
state vagrancy law on grounds of vagueness remanded in light of Papachristou
decision, infra note 120).
138. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The case consolidates five separate arrests under the
vagrancy ordinance for such charges as "prowling by auto" and "disorderly loiter-
ing." Id. at 158.
139. Id. at 157 n.1. Other descriptions of vagrants included "common night
walkers . . . [and] persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of
their wives or minor children . . . " Id. at 156-57 n.1.
140. Id. at 163 ("[t]he Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which by
modern standards are normally innocent"). Justice Douglas refers to Walt Whitman
and Henry David Thoreau in praising the freedom of nightwalking as an "amenity"
he recognized is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. Id. at 164.
Municipal ordinances that restrict the sale of paraphernalia designed for drug use
have recently been challenged on void-for-vagueness grounds. See, e.g., Hoffman
Estates v. Flipsid,', Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (municipal ordinance
requiring license to sell such merchandise upheld as not void for vagueness; since
ordinance challenged restricts business enterprise, as opposed to law that interferes
with free speech or association, it is subject to less severe vagueness test because a
business "can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action");
Florida Businessman v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 1982)
(state "head shop" law upheld; phrases "designed for use" and "reasonably should
know" were not unconstitutionally vague).
141. 405 U.S. at 165 ("[h]ere the net cast is large ... to increase the arsenal of the
police"); see also People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1973) (state loitering law held unconstitutionally vague). The facts in the Berck case
show the fine line the void-for-vagueness doctrine can follow in judicial application.
The police had observed the defendant after midnight standing behind a tree near a
residence known by the police to be temporarily unoccupied. Upon confrontation,
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Similar problems have been found to exist with nonemergency
curfew ordinances applying to all age groups, 4 2 and those particu-
larly applicable to juveniles. 43 Some of the juvenile curfews have been
found void for vagueness due to the improper use of a particular word
or phrase 144 or the failure to specify a time when the curfew period
the defendant refused to identify himself or explain his presence. Id. at 576, 300
N.E.2d at 416, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42. The statute that was held void had required
three elements for a loitering offense: (1) loitering in a place without apparent
reason, (2) under circumstances which justify suspicion of an impending crime, and
(3) after refusal of the suspect to identify himself or give an account of his conduct.
Id. at 569 n.1, 300 N.E.2d at 412 n.1, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 35 n.1. As in Papachristou,
the New York Court of Appeals felt that such a statute gave too much discretion to
the police and expressed fear that it would be enforced arbitrarily. Berck at 571, 300
N.E.2d at 414-15, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
142. See Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303, 305 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (phrase
"activity of necessity," which constituted exception to 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
curfew declared by mayor, was "obviously so unclear as to support a finding that the
ordinance's application is unconstitutionally vague"); Haves v. Municipal Court of
Oklahoma City, 487 P.2d 974, 975 n.2 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (loitering ordinance
providing that "any person who strolls or loiters idly about the streets" committed
criminal act held void for vagueness); Borough of Dumont v. Caruth, 123 N.J.
Super. 331, 340, 302 A.2d 566, 570 (1973) (park loitering ordinance containing word
"loiter" held to be void for vagueness): City of Portland v. James, 251 Or. 8, 9, 13,
444 P.2d 554, 554, 557 (1968) (municipal police code ordinance which made it
unlawful to "roam or be upon any street . . . without disclosing a lawful purpose"
held void for vagueness; "[t]he principal evil of such vague legislation is that it invites
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement"); City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d
405, 406, 409, 423 P.2d 522, 523, 524 (1967) (ordinance which prohibited "wander-
ing or loitering abroad, or abroad under other suspicious circumstances" after dark
was unconstitutionally void for vagueness; "lay meaning of loitering cannot reasona-
bly connote unlawful activity"). See also Recent Decisions, Constitutional Validity of
Curfew Ordinances, 55 MIcH. L. REV. 1026, 1028 (1957) (distinguishing loitering
ordinance prohibition directed at "mere idleness" from one prohibiting loitering for
"illegal or unlawful purposes," latter type being more likely to withstand constitu-
tional challenge).
143. The court in Johnson, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981) did not examine the
wording of the statute, although the language used, which made it unlawful to
"travel, loiter, wander, stroll or play," see id. at 1067 n.1, is virtually the same as
that found in other void-for-vagueness cases, notably Papachristou v. City of Jack-
sonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. The
lower court in Johnson, however, did examine the plaintiff's claim of void-for-
vagueness, and found that the phrases "emergency errand" and "responsible adult"
contained in the curfew ordinance were not impermissibly vague. Johnson, 488 F.
Supp. at 441.
144. See, e.g., In re Doe, 54 Hawaii 647, 651, 513 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1973)
(Honolulu juvenile curfew ordinance unconstitutionally vague because word "loiter-
ing" did not provide notice as to what conduct constitutes wrongful activity in
violation of statute); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 795 n. 1, 799, 514
P.2d 1059, 1060 n.1, 1063 (1973) (city curfew ordinance which made it unlawful to
"loiter, idle, wander or play" held void for vagueness as these words do not have lay
meaning which connotes wrongful misconduct of type constitutionally punishable).
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would end.'45 In Bykofsky,1 46 a severability clause 47 in the ordinance
was utilized by the district court to eliminate words and phrases that
were found to be unconstitutionally vague.148 Some of the words and
phrases challenged by the petitioners were found not to be void for
vagueness, notably the word "remain" in the curfew prohibition
clause. 49 After the words found to be unconstitutionally vague were
deleted, the entire corrected ordinance was found sufficiently clear to
satisfy due process requirements. 150
Examination of the Trenton, Newark and Detroit curfews reveals
that the most serious vagueness problem exists with the Newark ordi-
nance. The prohibitions contained therein make it unlawful for a
But see In re Nancy C., 28 Cal. 3d 747, 756, 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 119 (1972) (juvenile
curfew upheld; court stated "it is obvious that the words 'loiter, wander, and idle' are
not used in the ... restrictive, sinister sense"). This reasoning seems to run counter to
the analysis used in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), supra note 137,
because the fact that there are non-sinister connotations for the words used in the
curfew suggests that there is a vagueness problem.
145. See Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815 (2nd Cir. 1976). The court
reasoned that this shortcoming in the juvenile curfew "renders the ordinance suscep-
tible to arbitrary, capricious and erratic enforcement and therefore it is unconstitu-
tional in its application." Id. at 818.
146. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
aff'd mere., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
147. The pertinent provision in Bykofsky, section 9 of the Middletown curfew
ordinance, sought to provide for liberal judicial construction:
Severability is intended throughout and within the provisions of the Cur-
few Ordinance. If any provision, including inter alia any exception, part,
phrase or term, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is
held invalid, the application to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby and the validity of the Curfew Ordinance in any and all
other respects shall not be affected thereby.
401 F. Supp. at 1273. The drafters also anticipated constitutional challenges to the
nonemergency curfew, as the ordinance states that it should "be held inapplicable in
such cases, if any, where its application would be unconstitutional." Id.
148. Id. at 1250-51. The court found the following phrases to be void because
unconstitutionally vague: "Normal" nighttime activities; "a minor well along the
road to maturity;" "consistent with the public interest"; "a sufficient degree of
maturity"; and "as an incentive to and in recognition of approaching maturity." Id.
149. Id. at 1252. The words "reasonable necessity" used as a curfew exception,
and the phrases "best interests of said minors and of the Borough" and "necessary
night-time activities" were found not to be unconstitutionally vague, id. at 1250-52,
with the court concluding that "[t]he values which the void for vagueness doctrine
furthers are adequately protected by this ordinance." Id. at 1253. Contra Ruff v.
Marshall, 438 F. Supp. at 305, supra note 142. See also Comment, Constitutional
Law-Police Power-Municipal Ordinance-Philadelphia Curfew Law, 1 VILL. L.
REV. 51, 53 n.7, 63 (1956) (concluding that Philadelphia nonemergency curfew
ordinance, containing words "remain" and "public place," is not void for vagueness
under due process clause).
150. Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1252.
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minor to "loiter, idle, wander, stroll or play" in public areas after the
curfew hour. ' 5' Virtually the same language was contained in the city
vagrancy ordinance found unconstitutionally void in Papachristou. 152
Since the Detroit curfew is a "mere presence" type of juvenile
curfew, 153 a vagueness problem does not arise. The prohibitory lan-
guage of the curfew makes it unlawful for a minor "to be on" public
streets after the curfew hour. 154 Instead, such language will pose
constitutional problems relating to the overbreadth doctrine.155
The Trenton curfew is carefully drafted and avoids a void-for-
vagueness problem. The drafters apparently followed the vagueness
analysis applied by the BykoJsky 156 court and eliminated all of the
phrases found by the court to be unconstitutional. 57 The Trenton
ordinance also includes a severability clause to enable the statute to
survive constitutional challenge if a particular word or phrase is found
to be void for vagueness. 158
C. Substantive Due Process
Nonemergency juvenile curfew ordinances have also been chal-
lenged on substantive due process grounds. 159 The initial step in a
substantive due process analysis is to ascertain whether the challenged
151. NEWARK CURFEW, supra note 66.
152. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 157 n.1 (1972) ("persons
wandering or strolling around"). The Court also discusses the vagueness problem that
arises from the words used in the ordinance. Id. at 162-64.
153. See DETROIT CURFEW, supra note 60, § 36-3-1 ("[i]t shall be unlawful for a
minor to be on the public streets .
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 93-134 and accompanying text.
156. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aJJ'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.),
cert denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
157. See 401 F. Supp. at 1248-53; TRENTON CURFEW, supra note 70, § 4(g) (exclud-
ing "normal" and "minor well along the road to maturity") and § 4(h) (excluding
"normal" and "consistent with the public interest"). See supra note 148 and accom-
panying text.
158. See TRENTON CURFEW, supra note 70, § 4(k) (nearly identical to Middletown
curfew severability provision considered by Bykofsky court, 401 F. Supp. at 1270-71
and supra notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text).
159. See infra notes 167-93 and accompanying text. The expansion of the scope of
protection provided against state restrictions which violate a person's liberty began in
the late 1800's and has involved Supreme Court decisions in the areas of education,
freedom of contract and discrimination, among others. See Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 n.2 (1977) (city zoning ordinance which restricted
occupancy of dwellings to only limited types of blood relatives violated petitioner's
liberty as protected by due process clause); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534 (1925) (state law requiring parents to send their children to public schools
violated parents' liberty; Court nonetheless recognized state's police power to regu-
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state restriction infringes upon a plaintiff's fundamental right.16 0 This
in turn will determine whether a reviewing court should apply a strict
standard of scrutiny to the state restriction and judge whether the
statute or ordinance is necessary to further a compelling state inter-
est.161 If a fundamental right is not at issue, a less severe standard is
late quality of nonpublic schools and to require attendance of minors below certain
age at approved nonpublic or public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (statute prohibiting teaching of foreign language in public grammar schools
held to violate liberty protected by due process clause, such "liberty" including "not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men . . . "); Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (state law prohibiting its citizens from contracting for
insurance outside of state violated due process protection of petitioner's "liberty,"
which Court stated included "not only the right of the citizen to be free from the
mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but . . . [also] the right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all of his faculties; to be free to use them in
all lawful ways... "). See generally KAUPER & BEYTAGH, supra note 92, at 585, 601,
698-701, 710, 750-51, for a discussion of Supreme Court approaches to substantive
due process issues and the extent to which the fourteenth amendment incorporates
the protections of the Bill of Rights against state law infringement.
160. The Supreme Court prefers to protect individual fundamental rights by
reference to specific clauses in the Bill of Rights as opposed to basing a decision solely
on substantive due process grounds. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). The Griswold Court held that the state law prohibiting any use of contracep-
tives was unconstitutional. Justice Douglas made reference to the first, third, fourth,
fifth and ninth amendments to reach the conclusion that "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance . . . [v]arious guarantees create zones of privacy."
Id. at 484. As an example, the opinion states that the enumerated freedoms of speech
and press include the unenumerated peripheral freedoms to print, distribute and
receive information, to inquire and to teach. Id. at 482.
The Court has held, however, that a state restriction was unconstitutional solely
on due process grounds without reference to the Bill of Rights provisions. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In holding that the state law which restricted legal
abortions was unconstitutional, the Court incorporated the fundamental right to
privacy, which includes the right of a mother to decide to terminate her pregnancy,
"in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action . . ." Id. at 153.
161. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163, 173-74; Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536,
541 (1942) (state law punishing "habitual criminals" by sterilization held void under
equal protection clause; Court held for first time that strict scrutiny approach must
be used because "fundamental" rights of marriage and procreation are infringed by
statute).
Only one case challenging a nonemergency juvenile curfew analyzed the constitu-
tionality with an equal protection approach. A strict scrutiny approach must also be
applied under the equal protection clause where a state law affects a fundamental
right or creates a suspect classification. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-40 (1972). In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp.
1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aJ-f'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
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applied, and the statute need only be reasonably related to a legiti-
mate state interest to be upheld as constitutional. 1 2
The Supreme Court has recognized that minors share coextensive
due process rights with adults in certain areas, such as criminal proce-
dures, 16 3 but that the state has a greater interest in restricting activities
964 (1976), the district court held that there was no suspect classification created by
the fact that the curfew applied only to minors, and noted that the "age classification
...rests on real and substantial differences between adults and minors .... ." Id. at
1265. See also Juvenile Curfew, supra note 60, at 137-39. But see infra notes 181-85
and accompanying text (discussion of question whether age difference between mi-
nors and adults constitutes constitutional justification for nonemergency curfew reg-
ulations). The court also concluded that no fundamental rights were infringed by the
juvenile curfew, id. at 1265, thereby rendering a strict scrutiny approach unnecessar-
ily severe and inapplicable.
162. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (state law withholding funding from
school districts for children of illegal aliens found unconstitutional under fourteenth
amendment); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-39, 55
(1973) (state property tax system of public school financing upheld; Court applied
minimum scrutiny test after finding that no "fundamental right" to education exists
and that "state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest ... ");
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (state law requiring parents to
send their children to public school held void; "rights guaranteed by the Constitution
may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923)
(state law prohibiting language instruction at public grammar schools held void as
"arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the
State"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (state law limiting number of
hours bakers could work in a week held unconstitutional; restriction was not a "fair,
reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, [but was] ...
an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the indi-
vidual to his personal liberty... ").
163. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (prosecution of juvenile in
adult court after adjudicatory proceeding involving same crime violated due process
clauses of fifth and fourteenth amendments and minor's protection against double
jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (conviction of minor in family
court based upon "preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof reversed; minors
are entitled to same "beyond reasonable doubt" standard adults enjoyed as required
by "the essentials of due process and fair treatment"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13
(1967) (conviction of minor for adult crime reversed due to failure of juvenile court to
provide notice to minor and his parents of charges brought against him and of his
right to counsel; "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
adults alone"); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (indictment for robbery
dismissed where juvenile court had waived jurisdiction in favor of adult court with-
out granting minor hearing and representation by counsel). But see McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (Court refused to require states to provide
juries in juvenile proceedings because this was one of few remaining distinguishing
characteristics of juvenile, as opposed to adult, proceedings; Court refused to end
"idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding"). See generally
Note, Fourth Amendment Protection For the Juvenile Offender: State, Parent and
The Best Interests of the Minor, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1140 (1981).
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that are especially harmful to minors, such as the sale of pornographic
literature." 4 When the challenged ordinance or statute is a non-
emergency curfew, the question arises whether the nonemergency
restriction, which would be unconstitutional if applied to adults,
violates a minor's due process rights. 165
Two federal decisions have recognized that restrictive non-
emergency curfew ordinances do infringe upon important constitu-
tional rights of minors. 66 In Bykofsky, 167 a district court recognized
The Court has registered its dissatisfaction with the operations of the juvenile
justice systems in the various states, noting that "studies ... raise serious questions as
to whether actual performance [of the juvenile justice systems] measures well enough
against theoretical purpose[s] [sic] to make tolerable the immunity of the process
from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to adults." Kent, 383 U.S. at
555. Justice Blackmun in a later opinion stated that the major causes of the systems'
overall failures were communities' unwillingness to devote the time, concern and
facilities necessary, and the lack of professional people and alternative delinquency
prevention ideas. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544. See supra note 14 for a discussion of
Congress's opinion of the juvenile justice system's failure.
164. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968) (state law making sale of
pornographic materials to minors under seventeen with knowledge of minor's age
illegal upheld as constitutional); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
(defendant's conviction for violating state child labor law by allowing her nine year
old niece to work with her selling religious literature in public streets upheld;
however, in areas where societal evil such as child labor is not concerned, "the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder").
Where minors are not subject to harmful activities, it has been held that they have
constitutional rights substantially coextensive with those of adults. See, e.g., Coss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (state law allowing for public school's suspension of
minor petitioners for ten days without hearing held to violate minors' due process
rights, including their "liberty interest in reputation"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upheld minor's right to first amendment
expression in wearing protest armband where no disruption to school activities
resulted).
165. See TRIBE, supra note 93, at 1077-82. Constitutional problems are posed by
the prevalence of "conclusive presumptions" that more restrictive legislation is justi-
fied when applied to youths merely because they are children. Professor Tribe
suggests a middle ground between granting completely coextensive constitutional
rights for children as adults and greatly limiting the rights of minors: "[C]onclusive
presumptions need not be abandoned wholesale in order to concede that readily
disprovable generalizations about children-like all other measures for which 'less
restrictive alternatives' exist-cannot suffice to justify what would, absent the fact of
childhood, constitute an action beyond the power of the state." Id. at 1078.
166. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1253-55 (M.D.
Pa. 1975), afJ'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976);
Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981). The Bykofsky
court, however, decided that the constitutional rights infringed upon were not
"fundamental". 401 F. Supp. at 1265. The Johnson court did not decide the issue of
whether the rights infringed were "fundamental". 658 F.2d at 1072.
At least one Supreme Court justice has suggested that some of the constitutional
rights affected by a nonemergency juvenile curfew may be fundamental. See Doe v.
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that the substantive right of freedom of movement is protected by the
due process clause, 168 and that a minor's presence on the street might
constitute innocent activity.1' 9 The court decided, however, that the
state's asserted interests in "the protection of the younger children...
the enforcement of parental control ...the protection of the public
...[and the] reduction in the incidence of juvenile criminal activ-
ity" 70 outweigh the minor's liberty interests.' 7 ' Although the court
admitted that it is "impossible to ascertain with scientific certainty'
71 2
whether the curfew achieves its main goal of reducing juvenile delin-
quency, it concludes that since it does prevent "some"'73 juvenile
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209-12, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("the freedom to
care for one's health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion,
freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf ..." is fundamental, and thus protected bv due
process clause from restrictions which are not necessary to support compelling state
interest); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (acts of
walking, wandering and strolling are referred to as "historically part of the amenities
of life as we have known them"). See also In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 99, 394
N.E.2d 368, 377 (C.P. Van Wert County 1978) (wandering, walking, loitering and
strolling are "fundamental" rights unconstitutionally infringed upon by juvenile
curfew) (citing Papachristou, supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text).
167. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aJJ'd inm., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
168. Id. at 1255 ("[n]o right is more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, bv the
liberty assurance of the due process clause than the right of every citizen to the
possession and control of his own person, free from restraint or interference by the
state").
169. Id. at 1254 (examples of innocent activities protected by the due process
clause include "exercise, recreation, walking, standing, talking, socializing .
170. Id. at 1255.
171. Id. at 1256.
172. Id. See also TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 24 (difficulty
of measuring effectiveness of particular deliquency prevention program arises from
task of proving that preventive actions "led to anticipated events not happening");
STOTT, supra note 1, at 4-5 (mentions difficulty of measuring such important varia-
bles as parental affection and discipline, both of which can be vital factors in
preventing delinquency). Another practical difficulty in determining whether a juve-
nile curfew reduces delinquency is caused by the fact that only a small portion of all
reported crimes result in arrests. This makes it impossible to determine how many, of
the crimes not leading to an arrest were committed by juveniles. Telephone interview
with Officer Hugh Donnelly, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Dep't, Director of Pub.
Information (Jan. 24, 1984). See also Juvenile Curfews, supra note 60, at 112 n. 14;
D. GIBBONS, DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR 52 (1981) (hidden or undetected delinquent acts
occur on all social class levels, and it is important to realize that an "important
number of serious delinquencies [are] enacted by juveniles who manage to stay out of
the hands of the police or courts").
173. Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1256. In apparent contradistinction to its apolo-
getic view towards the lack of verifiable proof of the curfew's effectiveness, the court
had previously stated that the ordinance "makes a substantial contribution to the
alleviation of nocturnal juvenile criminal activity." Id.
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crime, there is a "rational relation between the end sought and the
means chosen. ,174
The Johnson175 decision examined the substantive due process issue
raised by the nonemergency curfew in light of the subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Dan-
forth, 7 , Bellotti v. Baird, 177 and Carey v. Population Services Interna-
The court's opinion of the effectiveness of juvenile curfews in preventing delin-
quency has been challenged. See People v. Chambers, 66 I11. 2d 36, 46, 360 N.E.2d
55, 59 (1976), rev'g, 32 I11. App. 3d 444, 335 N.E.2d 612 (1975) (Goldenhersh, J.,
dissenting) (majority's statistics showing general increase in juvenile crime are "inter-
esting but are utterly without value insofar as the crucial question presented is
concerned, i.e., how many of these offenses are committed [during the curfew
period?]"); New Curfews, supra note 67, at B5, col. 3 (head of Trenton Police
Department, Youth Division, challenging effectiveness of revised Trenton curfew,
stated that more than 86% of crimes committed by juveniles in Trenton in first nine
months of 1983 occurred before 10:00 p.m. curfew hour). See also Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. at 171 (crime prevention argument in favor of va-
grancy ordinance is discredited; "[t]he implicit presumption in these generalized
vagrancy standards-that crime is being nipped in the bud-is too extravagant to
deserve extended treatment"). But see Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, supra note 19, at
95-97 (although stating belief that effective curfew could make "substantial contribu-
tion" to reducing delinquency, author also admits that "an accurate determination of
the effectiveness of the curfew in achieving its objective is, as a practical matter,
impossible to ascertain").
174. Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1256. The Supreme Court denied petitioners'
application for a writ of certiorari after the court of appeals affirmed the curfew's
constitutionality. 429 U.S. 964 (1976). Three justices voted to hear the case, however.
In a vigorous dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan stated that because fundamental
rights of minors were involved, the state had the burden of showing that the curfew
was necessary for a compelling state interest. Id. at 965. The confusion in the lower
courts as to whether juveniles share coextensive due process rights with adults in this
area was considered a "substantial constitutional question" by the dissent. Id. at 965-
66. See Ex Parte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 452, 46 S.W. 936, 937 (1898) (minors
and adults have coequal rights of "ingress and egress," rendering juvenile curfew
unconstitutional; ordinance was "as rigid as military law").
175. Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
176. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (provisions of state abortion regulation held unconstitu-
tional, including requirement that minor seeking abortion must first obtain parental
consent). See also M. SHAPIRO & R. TREsOLINI, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 732-
33 (5th ed. 1979) (authors predict that Danforth decision that minors have constitu-
tional rights "as against their parents" will involve Supreme Court in future decisions
concerning family discipline problems) (emphasis in original).
177. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (state law requiring minor to obtain consent of both
parents, or order of judge for "good cause shown" after consulting with parents,
before having an abortion violates minor's due process rights). The judgment of the
Court suggested the requirements of a constitutional state abortion regulation appli-
cable only to minors:
Every minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to go directly
to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents. If she satisfies
the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelli-
gently the abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to
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tional.17' The Johnson court applied an innovative intermediate
scrutiny test which the Supreme Court had utilized for the first time
act without parental consultation or consent. If she fails to satisfy the court
that she is competent to make this decision independently, she must be
permitted to show that an abortion would nevertheless be in her best
interests. If the court is persuaded that it is, the court must authorize the
abortion.
Id. at 647-48.
The Court in Bellotti noted, however, that for decisions of minors in other areas, a
state may require parental notice and consent, such as for marriage prior to the age
of consent. Id. at 642. This reasoning is subject to criticism, however, in that the
decision to have an abortion seems to require an equivalent or greater degree of
maturity than does the decision to marry. While eleven states and the District of
Columbia forbid minors from marrying for the first time without parental consent
prior to their eighteenth birthday, see ALA. CODE § 30-1-5 (1975); CAL. CIv. CODE §
4101 (West 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-111 (1981); 1977 Fla. Laws 77-19; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-106 (1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 7 (Michie/Law. Coop.
1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.02 (West Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-02
(1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.060 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-250 (Law Co-op.
1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1976 & Supp. 1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.02
(West 1981), six states allow minors who are under eighteen and over sixteen to
marry with only the consent of a judge. See COL. REV. STAT. § 14-2-106 (1973 &
Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-2 (1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West 1981);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); MON'. CODE ANN. § 40-
1-202 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-6 (West Supp. 1983-1984). Twelve states allow
children under sixteen to marry in certain circumstances with their parents' consent
and judicial approval, see Ariz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-102 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-2-106 (1973 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 32-202 (Supp. 1983): LA. CODE CIv.
ANN. art. 92 (1952 & Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 62 (1981); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 62, § 9 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §
122.020 (1981); N.Y DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-1984); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-12 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5142 (Supp. 1983-1984);
W. VA. CODE § 48-1-1 (Supp. 1982), while nineteen other states do not require
parental consent in certain circumstances (such as when a minor under sixteen
becomes pregnant). See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-30 (1978 & Supp. 1983-
1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 572-1(2) (1976 &
Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 208 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-1-4(b)
(Burns 1973); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.103 (West Supp. 1983-1984); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-1-5 (1973 & Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.090 (Vernon 1977
& Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-5 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1976);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3 (West 1979);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(c) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
15-2-11 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-408 (1977); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.52
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); VA. CODE § 20-48 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.04.010 (Supp. 1983-1984); WYO. STAT. § 20-1-102 (1982). The inconsistent dis-
tinction based on age in the nonemergency curfew ordinances and the marriage
consent statutes is seen in the fact that a minor who may be permitted to marry when
under eighteen, either by judicial approval or with parental consent, may be subject
to a nonemergency juvenile curfew. See supra note 103, where only one curfew
considered in state and federal decisions has made exemptions for minors who are
accompanied by their spouse in public during the curfew period.
178. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (state law prohibiting sale of contraceptives except by
licensed pharmacists to purchasers over sixteen years of age, found unconstitutional
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in DanJorth, 7 stating that a nonemergency curfew would be valid
against minors only if it serves a " 'significant state interest ... that is
not present in the case of an adult.' "80 The Johnson court utilized the
analysis which had been used by a plurality of the Court in Bellotti'81
to ascertain whether there is a different significant state interest sup-
porting a nonemergency curfew ordinance specifically for minors. 82
The court concluded that: (1) there is no "peculiar" vulnerability of
children concerning the activities prohibited by the ordinance, such as
returning from nighttime school activities; 83 (2) the minor's decision
to travel or engage in associational activities after the curfew hour is
not a "critical" decision; 8 4 and (3) the restriction on a minor's travel-
under due process clause). The plurality opinion of Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Stewart and Blackmun applied the intermediate level of scrutiny that had been used
by the Court in Danforth, that "[s]tate restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors
are valid only if they 'serve any, significant state interest ... that is not present in the
case of an adult.' " 431 U.S. at 693 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. 75). It is relevant
that Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion placed the burden of presenting evidence of
the alleged state interest, here the discouragement of premarital sexual activity, upon
the state. In Carey, the state failed to show that such a restriction constituted "a
rational means for the accomplishment of some significant state policy." 431 U.S. at
696 n.22. The Carey Court used an intermediate level of scrutiny when it considered
the constitutionality of the state restriction, even though a minor's fundamental right
of privacy was involved. This was justified by the Court based on its recognition of
the greater state interest in regulating a minor's conduct. Id. at 693 n.15.
179. See 428 U.S. at 75 (1976).
180. Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1073. The court explicitly recognized, however, the
p6wer of the state to place regulations on minors in some situations where it would be
unconstitutional to place the same restrictions on adults. Id. at 1072. See supra note
164 for discussion of restriction of sale of pornographic materials to minors upheld in
Ginsberg,. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
181. 443 U.S. at 634 (1979). The plurality opinion described three areas where a
minor's constitutional rights may not be coextensive with rights enjoyed by adults: (1)
where minors are particularly vulnerable; (2) where they are unable to make deci-
sions in a mature manner; and (3) where the parental role in raising children is
especially important. Id.
182. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1073-74. The Johnson court also noted the fact that
the Supreme Court has not yet specified the standards which should be used when
inquiring into the question whether minors share coextensive due process rights with
adults in other areas. Id. at 1074.
183. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1073. The court contrasted the nonemergency
curfew situation, where a juvenile is not particularly vulnerable, with the area of
criminal procedure, where a minor is particularly vulnerable and entitled to a
separate procedural system. Id. See also Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite,
630 F.2d 1029, 1043 (5th Cir. 1980), remanded, 455 U.S. 283 (1982) (circuit court
found that minors were not subject to "special vulnerability" concerning alleged
dangers involved in playing video games).
184. Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1073. The court compared the decisions required by a
nocturnal curfew, such as whether to walk from nighttime school events, with those
decisions of minors in the areas of abortions and peaceful expression of their political
opinions, pursuant to their first amendment rights, and found that it would be
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ing to and from these activities actually impedes parents in raising
their children with minimal state interference. 8 5
The state courts that have considered the substantive due process
questions raised by juvenile curfews often have based their constitu-
tional conclusions on whether the particular ordinance had any sub-
stantial effect in achieving the purpose asserted.186 These cases were
unable to point to any statistical data to support their conclusions on
the effectiveness of the curfews.18 7
illogical to protect the latter from undue restrictions, but not the former. Id. See also
Aladdin's, 630 F.2d at 1043 (similar comparision is made with regulations of minor's
rights to play video games).
185. Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1074. See also Aladdin's Castle, 630 F.2d at 1043 (role
of parents to decide whether their child can enter video game center was wrongfully
assumed by city). The Aladdin court also makes the significant point that the ordi-
nance's requirement that a parent accompany the minor would, in practice, have
placed an unreasonable burden on the parents. Id. at 1043. The same point was
raised concerning the Newark and Trenton juvenile curfews by Deborah Karpatkin,
Esq., of the New Jersey American Civil Liberties Union. Telephone interview with
Deborah Karpatkin, Esq., New Jersey American Civil Liberties Union (Jan. 27,
1984). She pointed out that in many urban families where there are two working
parents, or only one parent, the family often relies on the assistance of the older
children in caring for the younger siblings. Thus, minors thirteen years of age and
older may have significant adult responsibilities which necessitate going to the store
or doing errands after the curfew hour. Parental accompaniment in such situations
might also be unreasonably burdensome. Karpatkin interview, supra.
186. A split exists among state jurisdictions. For cases finding that the juvenile
curfew in question did not have a substantial effect on its stated purpose and was
unconstitutional, see Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial Dist., 148 Cal. App. 2d
419, 425, 306 P.2d 601, 605 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) ("prohibition against the mere
presence of a minor on a street or in a public place between the designated hours for a
purpose other than required by his business, or unless accompanied by a parent or
legal guardian, has [no] real or substantial relationship to the primary purpose of the
statute"; "it therefore constitutes an unlawful invasion of personal rights... "); W.
J. W. v. State, 356 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("prohibition against
mere presence of a child . . . has [no] real relationship to the primary purpose of the
statute... "); In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 92-93, 394 N.E.2d 368, 374 (C.P. Van
Wert County 1978) (quoting Alves, supra); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d
794, 800, 514 P.2d 1059, 1063 (1973) (nonemergency curfew "bears no real or
substantial relationship to the proclaimed governmental interest-the protection of
minors"). But see In re Nancy C., 28 Cal. App. 3d 747, 758, 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (juvenile curfew upheld; "[t]o forbid juveniles from loitering in
the streets during nighttime hours has a real and substantial relationship to the dual
goal of protection of children and the community... "); People v. Chambers, 66 I11.
2d 36, 42, 360 N.E.2d 55, 57 (1976) ("[w]hen a child is at home during the late night
and early morning hours, it is protected from physical as well as moral dangers");
City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 70 Ohio App. 2d 212, 215, 220 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1966) ("curfew ordinances for minors are justified as necessary police
regulations to control the presence of juveniles in public places at nighttime with the
attendant risk of mischief"; "such ordinances promote the safety and good order of
the community by reducing the incidence of juvenile criminal activity").
187. See cases cited supra note 186.
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Only two state cases have approached their review of the chal-
lenged juvenile curfew primarily as a substantive due process question
and examined the issue of what level of judicial scrutiny to apply to
the ordinance. In Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 8 the court consid-
ered three questions when evaluating the municipal curfew chal-
lenged by the arrested minors: (1) whether there is an evil creating a
need for the juvenile curfew; (2) whether the means chosen has a "real
and substantial relation" to the end sought; and (3) whether the
juvenile curfew "unduly infringe[s] or oppress[es] fundamental
rights."'8 9 It appears that this due process analysis will produce the
same result as the approach used by the Johnson court. 90 Subse-
quently, in In re Mosier,""' a county court interpreted the Thistlewood
analysis as being the equivalent of a "compelling interest" scrutiny,'192
which, it concluded, must be applied by a court when reviewing a
nonemergency juvenile curfew ordinance. 93
188. 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 688 (1964).
189. Id. at 556, 204 A.2d at 693 (nonemergency juvenile curfew is -like any other
which restricts the activity or conduct of individuals, adult or minors, [in that it]
must not exceed the bounds of reasonableness").
190. See Johnson, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981). Applying the Thistlewood test to
the Opelousas curfew, the third question concerning the undue infringement would
be answered in the affirmative, as the lack of exceptions for legitimate nighttime
activity would render the curfew oppressive. Applying the Johnson due process
analysis to the Ocean City curfew considered in Thistlewoood, the fact that the
curfew was limited to one particular weekend where nearly riotous misbehavior had
occurred would likely constitute "a significant state interest" (quoting Danforth, 428
U.S. at 75, supra note 177), and render the curfew constitutional.
191. 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 394 N.E.2d 368 (C.P. Van Wert County 1978). The court
posited three questions as part of its due process analysis of the challenged curfew: (1)
what are a minor's constitutional rights; (2) what standard is to be used to test the
ordinance's constitutionality; and (3) is the juvenile curfew valid under this test? Id.
at 88, 394 N.E.2d at 371-72.
192. Id. at 93, 394 N.E.2d at 374. The court concluded that the Van Werten
ordinance would also be unconstitutional under the substantive due process approach
used by the Thistlewood court. Id.
193. Id. at 94-98, 394 N.E.2d at 374-76. The court viewed the Supreme Court
decision of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), supra note 168, as the turning point in the
expansion of the substantive due process rights of minors. Id. at 94, 394 N.E.2d at
374-75. The court rejected the reasoning of prior cases that failed to apply the
"compelling interest" test. It also stated that the Bykofsky court, 401 F. Supp. 1242
(M.D. Pa. 1975), afJ'd mern., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964
(1976), would have found the Van Wert ordinance unconstitutional as well. Id. at
97, 394 N.E.2d at 376.
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IV. An Alternative Proposal
The constitutional problems created by nonemergency juvenile cur-
few ordinances in the areas of overbreadth, 19 4 void for vagueness, 9 5
and infringement of substantive due process rights'96 suggest two pos-
sible approaches on the political and judicial levels. First, after exam-
ining the past decisions dealing with juvenile curfews, one might
conclude that a carefully drafted ordinance, such as the Middletown
curfew considered in Bykofsky, which provides for a sufficient num-
ber of excepted activities, 9 7 would withstand a constitutional chal-
lenge on the federal level. Thus, Johnson'9 8 would be seen merely as a
narrow statutory decision regarding a single, poorly drafted and
overly restrictive juvenile curfew. In consideration of this view, model
curfew ordinances 9 ' have been proposed which closely resemble the
Middletown 200 and Trenton 20 ' juvenile curfew ordinances.
194. See supra notes 93-134 and accompanying text for a discussion of the over-
breadth doctrine.
195. See supra notes 135-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the void-
for-vagueness doctrine.
196. See supra notes 158-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of substantive
due process and the liberty interests of minors.
197. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
afJ'd mern., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). See supra
note 111 and accompanying text.
198. Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra notes
102-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of Johnson.
199. See, e.g., Juvenile Curfew, supra note 60, at 152; MODEL ORDINANCE, supra
note 37, at 7-400.1 to 400.4; 2A T. MATTHEWS & B. MATTHEWS, MUNICIPAL ORDI-
NANCEs 226, § 40.39 (2d ed. 1973). These proposals appear below in chart form, with
the numbers listed in the "Exceptions" column representing the same situations as
described in supra note 45.
Age: Less Wording of
Proposal than . . . Days-Times Prohibition Exceptions
Juvenile 17 All: 11:00 p.m.- "to be in or 1+, 3+, 4,
Curfew 6:00 a.m. upon" 5, 7
MODEL (none (none "remain, idle 1 +, 2, 3 +,
ORDINANCE specified) specified) wander, stoll or 4, 5
play"
MATHEWS 12 All: 9:30 p.m.- "to be in or 1 +, 4, 5
(end not stated) remain upon"
Chart compiled by author from sources cited supra.
200. See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1266-73; supra note 111 and accompanying
text.
201. TRENTON CURFEW, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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A second alternative approach proposed here suggests that consider-
ation of recent Supreme Court decisions in other areas concerning the
due process rights of minors20 2 and the invalidation of the juvenile
curfew in Johnson20 3 lead to the conclusion that even a carefully
drafted nonemergency curfew ordinance, such as the Middletown or
Trenton curfew, would fail to surmount the "significant state interest"
scrutiny enunciated by the Court. 20 4 The crucial balancing of the
valid state interest in reducing delinquency against the recognized
liberty interests of minors suggests that a minor who may have a
significant level of maturity to decide whether to leave school, to
marry or to have an abortion should also be allowed the constitutional
freedom to decide when to begin or terminate his or her lawful public
presence.
The problems of youth violence and gang activities, however, are
harsh realities that cause great suffering and property loss in com-
munities and create difficult law enforcement problems for local po-
lice forces. 20 5 Where such activities proliferate in an urban area to a
degree which endangers the health, safety and welfare of the city
residents and creates an emergency situation, a local government
which finds its police force inadequate to control the situation should
be empowered to declare a state of emergency, prohibit certain activi-
ties and enact a temporary curfew. 20 6 Such curfews should be the rare
exception, however, and not standard municipal legislative practice.
This Note suggests that, in nonemergency situations, municipalities
which find that a severe delinquency problem evades effective en-
forcement under existing ordinances should enact a "loitering-prowl-
202. See supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases
relating to the minors' substantive due process rights.
203. 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
204. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976);
supra note 176 and accompanying text.
205. Nighttime gatherings of youths have the potential to lead to the commission
of delinquent acts. Telephone interview with Officer Slocombe, Los Angeles Police
Dep't, Juvenile Div. (Jan. 23, 1984). See also supra note 2 (discussion of juvenile
crime statistics).
206. See, e.g., A.L.R. LEGAL FORMS, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 570-71, § 180:121
(Proclamation by mayor-State of emergency due to civil disturbance) (1973). The
sample emergency curfew would also empower the mayor to temporarily prohibit
the public from possessing licensed firearms or explosive materials or liquids in public
and prohibit the sale or purchase of alcoholic beverages. Id. See generally Riot
Curfew, supra, note 30, at 453-66 (describing government procedures involved in
exercise of emergency powers).
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ing" type of ordinance applicable to minors and adults similar to a
proposed Model Penal Code draft. 207 Innocent activity and mere pres-
ence in public would not be punishable, 20 but police officers, when
observing individuals who seek to conceal themselves or some object,
or who take flight, upon seeing the officer, in a manner that "war-
rants alarm," would be permitted to approach such persons as poten-
tial violators of such an ordinance. 20 9 The officer would then be
required to allow the suspect to explain the observed conduct and
207. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES 382-98, § 250.6 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as M.P.C.]. A number of states have enacted a prowling-loitering statute based
upon section 250.6. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2914 (1977 & Supp. 1983); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970 & Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1321(6)
(1979 & Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
11-36 (1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:6 (1974); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.045
(1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-703 (1978). See also People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567,
573 n.5, 300 N.E.2d 411, 415 n.5, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, 39 n.5 (1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1093 (1973) (majority held part of state loitering ordinance void, but supported
adoption of Model Penal Code draft of loitering provision) (as of 1982-83 version of
New York Penal Code, such a provision still had not been adopted); City of Seattle v.
Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 412, 423 P.2d 522, 526 (1967) (court held municipal
loitering ordinance void and urged adoption of Model Penal Code draft).
208. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ordi-
nance considered in Papachristou, 402 U.S. 156 (1972). Unlike the vagrancy ordi-
nance held to be unconstitutional due to vagueness in Papachristou, the Model Penal
Code ordinance would allow a police officer to act on pre-arrest suspicion of a
loitering violation only in three situations: (1) upon flight of a suspect; (2) upon
attempted concealment after seeing the officer; or (3) after suspect's refusal to
identify himself. M.P.C., supra note 198, at 382. This Note proposes to eliminate this
third cause of valid pre-arrest suspicion. See in fra note 209. It is arguable that a
reasonable person should be aware that his flight or attempted concealment upon
seeing a police officer would raise the officer's suspicion and justify his stopping that
person. As the Model Penal Code Commentary suggests, "[i]f even the Model Code
provision is unconstitutionally vague . . . then it seems likely that no general provi-
sion against loitering can be drafted to survive constitutional review." M.P.C., supra
note 207, at 396.
The problem of arbitrary police enforcement mentioned in Papachristou would
arguably be averted by the requirement that an officer must allow a pre-arrest
suspect to dispel the alarm raised by his flight or concealment. If the officer refuses to
believe the suspect's explanation or identification, the subsequent proof at trial of the
truth of the explanation will exonerate the accused loiterer. See infra note 209 and
accompanying text.
209. See M.P.C., supra note 207, at 382. The Model Penal Code draft includes a
third situation which warrants the creation of alarm on the part of a police officer
such as to arouse pre-arrest suspicion: where a person refuses to identify himself when
approached by an officer, the officer may, after allowing the person the requisite
opportunity to dispel the alarm, arrest the person for violating the curfew ordinance.
Id. This Note proposes the exclusion of this provision. The failure of a person to
identify himself when approached by an officer should not by itself create an "alarm-
ing" situation so as to justify an arrest, but instead should only allow the officer to
"make such observations as would facilitate later identification of the suspect if a
crime did take place," id. at 389, or to continue surveillance to prevent a possible
crime.
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identify himself. l° If the explanation given is not believed by the
officer and an arrest is made, the person arrested can show his inno-
cence by substantiating the truth of his explanation at trial. 21' This
would enhance law enforcement efforts to prevent crime, including
juvenile delinquency, in a manner which upholds first amendment
rights protected by the due process clause, without punishing individ-
uals for innocent activity.
IV. Conclusion
Nonemergency juvenile curfew ordinances infringe upon the consti-
tutionally protected liberty interests of minors even where they are
carefully drafted to include exceptions for certain activities after the
curfew period. Where such ordinances do not include these excep-
tions, they frequently have been found unconstitutional because pro-
tected first amendment activities are infringed upon by the overly
broad curfew restriction, or because the curfew violates a minor's
substantive due process rights.212 Municipal curfews should be enacted
only in emergency situations and should not be used as a means of
creating convenient law enforcement methods beyond existing penal
sanctions against unlawful conduct. The serious problem of juveiile
delinquency requires greater federal and state participation and fi-
nancial support for improved programs specifically designed to pre-
The finding of criminal liablity based on a person's refusal to identify himself to a
law enforcement officer creates potential constitutional infringements of the fifth
amendment's protection against self-incrimination. See Garner v. United States, 424
U.S. 648, 665 (1976) (petitioner's conviction under federal gambling statutes based in
part upon his tax return occupation designation as "professional gambler" upheld
notwithstanding claim that use of his statements violated fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination; Court found that because petitioner "made disclosures
instead of claiming the privilege [of not designating his occupation] on his tax return,
his disclosures were not compelled incriminations"); California v. Byers, 402 U.S.
424, 425, 434 (1971) (state "hit and run" statute, which required driver involved in
accident to stop and identify himself, is constitutional despite respondent's claim that
such requirement compels person to make self-incriminating statements contrary to
fifth amendment). In Byers, the Court stressed that the person's identification does
not in itself subject him to criminal liability, and that, although "identity, when
made known, may lead to inquiry that in turn leads to arrest and charge, those
developments depend on different factors and independent evidence." 402 U.S. at
433-34. This situation can be distinguished from the third requirement of the Model
Penal Code draft where a person would be subject to arrest merely from his refusal to
identify himself to a police officer. M.P.C., supra, at 397-98.
210. M.P.C., supra note 207, at 391.
211. Id.
212. See supra notes 93-134, 159-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
overbreadth doctrine and substantive due process.
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vent delinquency, and for general social programs aiming to improve
the economic and emotional stability of families.2 13 Private agencies
and religious organizations must make greater efforts to increase local
participation in such programs. Juvenile curfew legislation should not
utilize police action as a substitute for improved social welfare and
crime prevention programs as means for reducing juvenile delin-
quency.
Paul M. Cahill
213. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of delinquency
prevention programs and state and federal legislation aiming to reduce juvenile
delinquency.

